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Documents

June 13, 1953

Cable 5321, from Ambassador Reber in Bonn to US State, Washington

Cable from Samuel Reber to U.S. Department of State Outlining U.S. Perspectives on Four-Power Talks

May 24, 1974

Memorandum of Conversation between Emil Bodnaras and Harry G. Barnes, US Ambassador to Romania

March 1, 1962

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler, 'Secretary McNamara’s Views on Nuclear Sharing'

Secretary of Defense McNamara and his Deputy Gilpatric discuss whether assisting the French with missile technology would advance their nuclear weapons program. They speculate that it will help indirectly, missile aid would reduce the cost of the French missile research program and those saving could be directed to warhead production.

March 9, 1962

Memorandum of Telephone Message from Foy D. Kohler to Paul H. Nitze and Roswell L. Gilpatric

Instructions for Roswell Gilpatric and Paul Nitze from Secretary of State Rusk for negotiations with the French. Among the topics which the US representatives should not discuss are missile sharing and a common Western nuclear force.

May 28, 1962

Memorandum by Edward Biegel, Bureau of Western European Affairs, 'WE Answers to the Ball Questionnaire'

Edward Biegel of the Bureau of Western European Affairs answers Undersecretary Ball's questions on French nuclear ambitions and Western European collective security. He makes the arguments against nuclear sharing, and also mentions the fact that a Baltimore Sun article likely alerted the Soviets to the fact that the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons on the German front.

August 8, 1963

Memorandum from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball to President Kennedy, 'A Further Nuclear Offer to General De Gaulle'

Undersecretary Ball outlines for President Kennedy the reasons why assisting the French nuclear program is not in America's interests. It suggests that De Gaulle would only accept assistance if there were no political conditions attached, and to do so would jeopardize US interests in Europe and NATO.

April 22, 1969

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations

This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.

October 21, 1969

Memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 'British Position on Nuclear Cooperation with France'

The British have not made any military or nuclear alliance with France, and they will disclose any such approaches from France to the United States. The U.S. is willing to say in response that they have not been approached by the French and would be willing to disclose any such approach in the future, but the U.S. is not willing say that their position is exactly the same as the British one because they "are not sure of the detailed implications of the broad phraseology of [the British’s] statement" and do not want to be bound to any extreme commitments.

May 29, 1953

Cable from Ambassador Charles Bohlen to John Foster Dulles regarding Transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany to Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Semyonov

Bohlen informs Dulles of the transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany, which does not yet provide much indication of future Soviet policy in East Germany except the solidification of East Germany's continued existence under the control of the USSR.

April 30, 1953

Cable from N. Spencer Barnes to US Department of State Reviewing Developments in the GDR since Stalin’s Death

Barnes analyzes developments within the GDR following Stalin’s death. Although there was an initial period of confusion within the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), it has been confirmed that Ulbricht is now directing SED and is continuing to implement socialization policy, though perhaps less dramatically than in the past. Barnes suggests that the Soviets may also be striving, to some extent, to decrease zonal tension.

Pagination