A record of the conclusions of the 186th meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met on March 6, 1962.  The attachment includes the initial instructions for the Czechoslovak delegations to the first meeting of ENDC. The document testifies to the strong preoccupation with West Germany’s re-armament, and the possibility of West Germany nuclear-weapon acquisition. Czechoslovakia travelled to Geneva with a goal of avoiding this outcome at any cost. Although the document offers a broad overview of the “lay of the land” ahead of the first meeting of ENDC, it is the focus on West Germany that is the most obvious here

The Czechoslovakia Executive Committee discusses the anti-Soviet protests of March 28-29 following the defeat of the Soviets by the Czechoslovak national team at the hockey world championships in Stockholm. Segments dealing with procedural or organizational matters and parts where the discussion repeats itself or digresses to other, unrelated issues have been omitted.

Report describing the polarized public response in Czechoslovakia to the Soviet-Czech hockey match during the World Championships in Vienna. The match (which Czechoslovakia lost 2-4) involved multiple fights and when the Soviet anthem played during the final ceremony it was accompanied by deafening boos and catcalls from the audience.

This East German report, issued after the Interkit meeting in Warsaw, addresses the situation in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Among the issues discussed are the ninth congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Mao's anti-Soviet foreign policy, especially China's relations with the US and West Germany. The ninth congress of the CCP is said to have stabilized Mao's position and is seen as the founding congress of a new party. Among other topics, the delegates also discuss ways to improve anti-Maoist propaganda.

The objectives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are outlined, as a result of the nationwide party congress on 28 November in Prague.

This transcript shows the Czech party elites choosing against violent repression of the mass protests in Wenceslas Square. More clearly than in almost any other Party document, the reasons for nonviolence are spelled out: such a solution would only temporarily "return calm," it would radicalize the youth, "the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on," and "the capitalist states" might react with a "political and economic boycott."

Calderio's visit to Prague in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis served to solidify the ties between Cuba and Czechoslovakia, relations that would persist until the end of the Cold War. Among the activities of Calderio's visit included attendance of 12th Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, meeting with Cuban ambassadors to China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a promise to attend the meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The report to Novotny details the happenings of the Cuban Missile Crisis at that time. Great Britain feels out of the loop and hurt by not being consulted by the United States before it took action, while Kennedy is not backing down on the blockade until the missiles are removed. According to the message, it is unclear whether there are nuclear missiles in Cuba at all; an American army colonel admits to the UN that no traces have been found, despite hundreds of photographs taken. In Czechoslovakia, the situation is unchanged; troops are still on alert and awaiting combat orders, with morale running high. There are even some volunteers willing to go to Cuba and aid their Latin comrades.

This concerns the status of Czechoslovak domestic organizations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Included in the report are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Central Council of Labor Unions, Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and the National Front.

This report to Antonin Novotny details the European military situation at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most NATO troops were on combat alert, but no increased activity or suspicious movements were reported. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces were at combat ready status to repel any attack by NATO.