Skip to content

Results:

1 - 7 of 7

Documents

March 14, 1985

Memorandum of Conversation Between M. S. Gorbachev and General Secretary of the CC NDPA [National Democratic Party of Afghanistan], Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] B. Karmal.

Gorbachev and Chairman Karmal discuss the future of Afghanistan with less intervention from the Soviets.

February 26, 1987

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 26 February 1987 (Excerpt)

Gorbachev and his advisors discuss whether to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

January 4, 1980

Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shad Mohammad Dost, 04 January 1980

Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shad Mohammad Dost on how to deal with negative opinions of the DRA by the West.

June 23, 1980

Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the situation in Afghanistan, 23 June 1980

CPSU CC Plenum meeting (excerpt) concerning the deterioration in relations with the US and NATO countries. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko describes the altruistic nature of Soviet intentions in aiding Afghanistan.

September 15, 1979

CPSU CC Politburo Decision with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun

CPSU CC Politburo Decision with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun on Amin’s ultimatums to Taraki, and on how to curtail repression from Amin’s supporters of Taraki’s supporters

February 16, 1980

Ciphered Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

A report from the Hungarian Embassy in India explaining that in the view of the Indian government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatens regional stability as it could invite American and/or Chinese intervention.

April 1, 1979

Memo on Protocol #149 of the Politburo, "Our future policy in connection with the situation in Afghanistan"

The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mistakes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 “revolution.”