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November 2, 1962

Summary of a Conversation between Cde. A. M. Rumyantsev, Editor-in-Chief of the journal 'Problemy Mira i Sotsializma', and Cde. Blas Roca, Member of the Secretariat of the National Leadership of the United Revolutionary Organizations

Blas Roca explains that the Cuban Missile Crisis "ought to be viewed as a defeat" for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

February 4, 1949

Cable, Joseph Stalin to Anastas Mikoyan

Stalin cable to Mikoyan, responding to Mikoyan's report that an American named Rittenberg is stationed with the Chinese Communist party as a spy. Stalin recommends an arrest of Rittenberg immediately, so as "to expsoe the network of American agents" operating in China. Stalin then notes that another American, writer Anna-Louise Strong, is also an American spy.

November 25, 1963

US State Department Translation, Cipher Telegrams No. 2000-2004, Anastas Mikoyan reports to CC CPSU after funeral of President Kennedy.

Pair of cipher telegrams from Anastas Mikoyan to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He is summarizing his meetings with State Department officials regarding Soviet newspaper reports of the Kennedy assassination. He also discusses U.S. government officials' and Jackie Kennedy's deep appreciation for the Soviet government's decision to send representatives to Kennedy's funeral.

November 25, 1963

Top Secret Cipher Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CPSU Central Committee

Mikoyan reports his recent conversations with US officials following JFK’s assassination. He reports that it is likely that Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, will likely maintain Kennedy’s policy on US-Soviet foreign relations. US Ambassador Thompson also talks to Mikoyan about US concerns about the Soviet press coverage of the assassination.

November 6, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU

Mikoyan reports to the CC CPSU regarding his conversations with the Cuban leadership. Fide Castrol had concerns about the possible withdraw of all Soviet weapons and all military specialists from Cuba and the possibility of UN inspections on Cuban territory.

January 31, 1949

Notes by Anastas Mikoyan ahead of Meetings with Mao Zedong

Notes taken by Minister of Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan during a meeting with Mao Zedong in Beijing. They discuss relations with the United States and other Western powers and the nationalization of foreign-owned factories in China. Mikoyan also gave advice on developing the new Communist government in China. Noteably, Mikoyan wrote that "the path of the regime of the people’s democracies, or the path of the Russian Soviet revolution, is not quite appropriate for China. China has its own path of development."

November 14, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 3:15 p.m., Wednesday

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 7:45 p.m., Friday

Pinto describes his conversation with the Cuban Minister of External Relations, Raúl Roa, which he says confirmed his impressions that the Cuban government, conscious of the gravity of the situation, is disposed to make concessions to reach a minimal guarantee.

November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 a.m., Friday

Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

Pagination