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April 22, 1955

Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai’s Remarks at the Signing Ceremony

Zhou Enlai reemphasized the cordial relation between China and Indonesia and expressed his delight with the signing of the treaty.

April 19, 1955

Supplementary Speech of Premier Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Asian African-Conference

Zhou Enlai claimed that although the PRC believed communism was positive, they did not come to the conference for the purpose of propaganda and wished to seek communality instead, otherwise they could have mentioned the Taiwan issue and the treatment of the PRC at the UN. He went on to stress that ideological and religious difference should not prevent countries from agreeing on fundamental points. Zhou also discussed China's opposition to interference in other countries' affairs.

February 10, 1955

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Ali Sastroamidjojo’s

Zhou Enlai informs the Indonesian Prime Minister that China has accepted the invitation to attend the Bandung Conference.

February 9, 1955

Cable from Dong, 'Record about the First Discussion on the Administrative Arrangement for the Presence of the Asian-African Conference'

Discussion between Chinese Vice Ministers and the Chinese Premier on what kind of cars should be bought to use at the Asian-African Conference and whether those cars should be sent from China.

May 11, 1965

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Test

Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong that favorable weather conditions will allow them to carry out the aerial nuclear test explosion. An official statement for the press has also been prepared.

May 10, 1965

Letter from Zhang Aiping, et al., to Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing on the Nuclear Test

On May 10, Chinese military officials confirm that they are prepared to detonate an aerial nuclear explosion but, due to unfavorable weather conditions, must postpone the test until May 12 or 13.

November 3, 1964

Record of Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with British Minister President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay

Having successfully executed a nuclear test explosion, Zhou Enlai describes the Chinese government’s motivation for pursuing atomic weapons capabilities. Zhou argues that the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is insufficient, that the United States remains committed to nuclear proliferation despite the agreement, and that China seeks to end the monopoly that other nuclear powers have thus far exploited. Zhou also calls for the organization of a global, truly equal summit at which to discuss the issue of nuclear weapons testing and proliferation.

October 11, 1964

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, et al., on the Nuclear Explosion

Zhou Enlai notifies Mao Zedong and other prominent political and military officials that preparations have been made to detonate the explosion between October 15 and 20, depending on weather conditions. Attention is also given to the high level of secrecy surrounding the explosion, methods of data collection, publicity, and the political consequences of the explosion.

September 21, 1964

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on the Nuclear Explosion

Zhou Enlai offers multiple dates on which the first nuclear test explosion may take place and asks Mao Zedong for his preference.

September 5, 1963

Zhou Enlai’s Discussion with a Kenyan African National Federation Delegation (Excerpt)

Zhou Enlai criticizes the Three-Nation Treaty (Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963, arguing that it signifies an attempt by the US, UK, and USSR to monopolize nuclear weapons. Enlai warns that the agreement will allow larger nuclear countries to commit “nuclear blackmail” against smaller, non-nuclear countries.

Pagination