Van Roijen writes to Amsterdam from Washington on a meeting between him and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk says there are now no more Soviet military personnel stationed in Cuba, although there are still technicians and instructors remaining. The belief is those too will soon leave after training the Cuban forces has completed. Rusk notes the icy relations between Moscow and Havana now, notably regarding Castro's refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Van Roijen continues on the conversation he had with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk from the last cable. Rusk believes Cuba may be aligning more with China and is factoring in Chinese interests in Cuba. However, Rusk also saw Chinese initiatives in North Korea and North Vietnam. The relationship with China is, in his words, "not a long-term worry like Moscow but a short-term worry."

The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch ambassador J. Herman van Roijen and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk said the Cuban issue still was a source of concern, with the upcoming anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, and was concerned about Havana in particular. Rusk conjectured that one of three things would happen: 1) Castro would announce joining the Non-Aligned Movement; 2) The extremists within the Communist Party would overthrow Castro; 3) A revolution against both Castro and the Russians would be mounted. The conversation concludes with Rusk complimenting President Kennedy for his aggressive yet prudent stance against the Soviets during the crisis.

The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

The cable is centered around Cuba and the Organization of American States (OAS). Van Roijen and Ward P. Allen discuss a cable intercepted from Venezuela about possible attempts of sabotage by pro-Castro organizations in Caracas. However, there is no report from the U.S. Embassy Caracas to confirm this. There are, however, protests being reported in the American-aligned Latin American countries, which is seen as an attempt by Cuba to stir revolutionary sentiment in these countries. The size and frequency of these protests by pro-Castro and communist groups is very limited.

The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch Ambassador to the United States van Roijen and Director Ward P. Allen of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, regarding further actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Allen made note that he had very little information regarding Cuba and how Cuba would fit into future dealings with the OAS.

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

Van Roijen writes again about the current situation in Washington just as the Cuban Missile Crisis is drawing to a close. The White House issued a statement regarding a proposal by Khrushchev. The statement's tough stance is attributed to Khrushchev's morning message which was completely different in content and tone to the personal message sent to Kennedy. The personal message amounted to admitting humiliating defeat by the Soviets with no mention of withdrawal of the U.S. missiles in Turkey. Van Roijen concludes that Kennedy made the right response to the previously offered Soviet deal, and kept the door open for consultation. The Cuban threat is almost "disappeared."

Van Roijen relates that the U.S. State Department has great interest in learning about the mood in Cuba, particularly Havana. Van Roijen asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs to forward all of Boissevain's correspondences including his personal letters to him.