Presumably written by by Minister Israel Galili some time in 1970, this note discusses the publication of a story on Israel’s nuclear program in the New York Times. According to the note, the story mentions “the agreement we have with the President,” alluding to the 1969 Richard Nixon-Golda Meir deal on Israel’s nuclear status. The note further attempts to analyze which source within the Nixon administration had approached the paper and leaked assessments on Israel’s nuclear capabilities, underscoring the secrecy and the sensitivity surrounding the 1969 understanding.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Or Rabinowitz.

A memorandum that outlines several proposed courses of action the United States could take in order to stop the fighting in the region, restart negotiations, provide Israel reassurance, and does not reflect weakness towards Moscow.

A recap of a meeting in which Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Dobrynin discuss proposed formulations to negotiate a peace in the Middle East, and the Soviet Union's involvement in the UAR.

A conversation between Rogers and Kissinger, in which they discuss the meeting Kissinger previously had with Israeli Ambassador Rabin, and Kissinger's overall involvement in negotiations with Israel.

In a letter to the President, Rogers plans to take advantage of the favorable conditions created by the recent talks in New York by continuing bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, and participating in the renewed Four Power talks at the UN. The goal is to restart dialogue by mid-November.

Secretary Rogers speaks on the American role in peace in the Middle East, discussing previous talks with the Soviet Union and the United Nations, and outlining some of the key issues and the American position on them.

An assessment of the US Government's strategy in the Four Power Talks, specifically focusing on the goal of a comprehensive and final Arab-Israeli settlement, but acknowledging the immense difficulties of this given the positions of other international players.

On 28 November 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls signed the NPT at the State Department and delivered a statement and a detailed note. At the signing Secretary Rogers spoke about the treaty’s value, the “historic” importance of the West German signature, the U.S. understanding that the UN Charter “confers no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany,” and a reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees to NATO and the Federal Republic.

During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

In his 28 March reply Secretary Rogers agreed that the computer issue needed more examination along with a further review of policy on sensitive technology exports, but he virtually blew off Laird’s request for a meeting and for deliberation outside of NSC channels. Instead, he advised that the Israeli nuclear problem be studied by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.