After consulting the Defense Intelligence Staff, Goodison writes to Kellas that "we must now accept the end of 1968 as the earliest possible date" for an Israeli nuclear bomb. As the Canadian report suggested an Israeli test by 1966, either 1968 was a typo or the Defense Intelligence Staff provided more detailed comments than are available in the file.

Alan Goodison reported that U.S. officials were skeptical of the Canadian report because their sources had no information about an Argentine-Israeli deal and Argentine exports to Israel had not been reported in the Official Bulletin.

Noting some inaccuracy in the Canadian Defence Research Board report---Argentina could not have offered to sell its “entire production” of uranium if it was also selling concentrate to Germany and trying to sell it to Japan—Goodison, of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, asked Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to “keep your ears to the ground” to find the “exact quantities” involved.

In a letter to Arthur Kellas, counselor at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, Alan Goodison of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department disclosed the Argentine-Israel uranium deal, which involved the transfer of 80-100 tons over 33 months. Since evidence suggested that Israel had facilities for plutonium separation, they estimated that there would be enough plutonium for a weapon within 20 months; however, Goodison had no proof that the Israelis planned to produce a nuclear weapon, only that they had the capability to do so. Minutes are attached.