Written by an unknown author (possibly Galili) to an unknown recipient, this document dates from September 1963. It points to the fact that Israel saw itself as stricltly in adherance to the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Ben Gurion in his letters to President John F. Kennedy, referred to the note as “B.G letters”. The note consists of a list of short explanatory statements on the nature of these commitments and how Israel interprets them.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Or Rabinowitz.

Presumably written by Minister Pinchas Sapir to Minister without Portfolio Yisrael Galili, this handwritten and undated note underscores the tension between those in the Israeli leadership who spearheaded the construction of Dimona, led by Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan, and those who doubted it and its financial feasibility, like Allon and others.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Or Rabinowitz.

Presumably written by by Minister Israel Galili some time in 1970, this note discusses the publication of a story on Israel’s nuclear program in the New York Times. According to the note, the story mentions “the agreement we have with the President,” alluding to the 1969 Richard Nixon-Golda Meir deal on Israel’s nuclear status. The note further attempts to analyze which source within the Nixon administration had approached the paper and leaked assessments on Israel’s nuclear capabilities, underscoring the secrecy and the sensitivity surrounding the 1969 understanding.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Or Rabinowitz.

This handwritten note, presumably from Minister Yigal Allon, most likely circa 1969-1970, demonstrates how Israel adopted the NPT’s nuclear test criteria for its own purposes, allowing the Israeli leadership to maintain that Israel was not a nuclear state. Allon’s adoption of the NPT’s nuclear test criteria mirrored Israel’s official language at the time when discussing the issue with state department officials.

Editor's note: Because of the unique provenance of this document, it should be treated as unauthenticated and interpreted skeptically. Readers are strongly encouraged to read the associated essay by Ori Rabinowitz.