1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
East Asia
North America
1893- 1976
1879- 1953
1913- 1983
1898- 1976
1908-
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December 16, 1950
Zhou Enlai advises the Chinese UN representatives on how to explain and respond to representatives from other countries regarding the Korea issue and the proposed armistice.
December 8, 1950
The CCP Central Committee gives instructions to the Chinese representatives to the UN on how to reply to confrontation over the Korean issue. The Chinese representatives are to express willingness to end military action as well as desire to know the UN and the U.S.'s positions on the conditions for an armistice.
April 22, 1974
Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.
August 30, 1951
Telegram from Mao to Stalin agreeing with the latter's assessment of the inadvisability of having neutral observers, at the present time, at the armistice talks.
December 7, 1950
A telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Moscow, informing the Soviet leadership of the terms under which the Chinese will consider an armistice on the Korean Peninsula.
November 9, 1950
Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.
January 29, 1951
A forward to Stalin of a message sent earlier by Mao to Peng Dehuai. It outlines operational plans for the PLA and KPA in and around Seoul and talks about the need to gain an advantageous military position with negotiations in mind.
July 3, 1951
The included telegram from Mao to Peng, Gao, and Kim gives Mao’s military instructions for the upcoming peace negotiations.
Stalin sends his advice on peace negotiations to Mao, as requested by Mao’s telegram of the same day.
June 28, 1954
Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.