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Documents

March 16, 1962

Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Beck), Report on the Federal Republic of Germany and Cuba

Ambassador János Beck reports on diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Cuba. Beck speculates that FRG does intelligence work for departed Americans. Central to Beck’s report is the fact that Cuba wants to preserve diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible. Relevant is the Hallstein principle and the presence of FRG diplomats and German Democratic Republic’s Political Commission. (There are two self-governing and independent German states in Cuba.)

June 1941

Report from the People’s Committee of Internal Affairs to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party, about Agent 'Volodya' (Imre Nagy)

Sverdlov provides a brief overview of agent "Volodya" (Imre Nagy) and his work.

March 10, 1938

Report on Imre Nagy’s Arrest by the NKVD (Commissariat of Internal Affairs)

Matusov and Altman report on Nagy's arrest on 4/5 March 1938 and subsequent release on 8 March, and describe some of his work.

March 31, 1984

KGB Report on New Elements in US Policy toward the European Socialist Countries

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

June 2007

Counter-Intelligence Protection, 1971. Folder 97. The Chekist Anthology.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.