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March 6, 1968

Record of Conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu on 6 March 1968

Brezhnev starts the conversation by asking if Ceausescu is in agreement about supporting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.  Ceausescu responds by saying that the draft could still improve by including a guarantee that countries without nuclear weapons will not be attacked by nuclear states and clarifying controls over nuclear weapon production.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, Sir Burke Trend, and Sir Solly Zuckerman at 10:30a.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Chalfont at 6:50p.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

October 28, 1966

J. A. Thomson (Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office) to J.E.D. Street (Head of the Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, Foreign Office), 'German Views on Non-Proliferation'

Before and after de Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Britain's second EEC application, Britain's position in Europe and its relationships with existing EEC states shaped the UK's role in the NPT negotiations. Prior to 1967, London canvassed opinion in EEC capitals, particularly in Bonn. As the NPT negotiations wound their way through the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (of which the United Kingdom was a member) in 1967, British representatives reported deep-seated concerns in Bonn, Brussels, the Hague, Luxembourg City, Paris, and Rome that a non-proliferation agreement might threaten the continued functioning of EURATOM, namely that its power might be subsumed into the IAEA, opening non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) up to commercial espionage conducted by inspectors representing the nuclear-weapon states (NWS).

November 30, 1967

Guidelines for the Czechoslovak Delegation attending the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1967

The final instructions for the Czechoslovak delegation en route to Geneva for the ENDC in November 1967.  The treaty was mostly finished by this time; only the final details remained. Denunciation of US foreign policy and prevention of West Germany’s nuclear weapon acquisition reappear in these instructions.

May 1963

Undated, untitled memorandum on Soviet-US Negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

March 6, 1962

Resolution of the 186th Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1962, 'Preparation of Czechoslovak Delegation and Proposal to be Sent to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament'

A record of the conclusions of the 186th meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met on March 6, 1962.  The attachment includes the initial instructions for the Czechoslovak delegations to the first meeting of ENDC. The document testifies to the strong preoccupation with West Germany’s re-armament, and the possibility of West Germany nuclear-weapon acquisition. Czechoslovakia travelled to Geneva with a goal of avoiding this outcome at any cost. Although the document offers a broad overview of the “lay of the land” ahead of the first meeting of ENDC, it is the focus on West Germany that is the most obvious here

February 1987

First Assessment of the Military Content of the 24th International Wehrkunde Conference from 31 January to 1 February 1987 in Munich

The report looks into the 24th Internationale Wehrkundetagung in Munich focusing on "Perspectives of NATO" and emphasizing a continued NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons and the strategy of flexible response. NATO policymakers did not endorse Egon Bahr's scheme for the creation of a nuclear- and chemical-weapons free zone in Europe.

June 29, 1979

Letter from J.F. MacCulloch (British Embassy, Bonn) to R.J. Alston (Joint Nuclear Unit), 'Israeli Comments on Pakistani and Libyan Nuclear Capability'

This letter, written from Jim MacCulloch at the British Embassy in Bonn to Robert Alston at the FCO's Joint Nuclear Unit, details a recent memorandum sent to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by Menachem Begin about the Pakistani nuclear program.

July 5, 1961

Record of a Conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Chen Yi, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China

Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

Pagination