1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
Middle East
North America
1937- 2006
1931- 2022
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1935-
1924- 2018
1930-
August 1985
This summary of Special Envoy Nakayama’s visit to Syria includes discussion of bilateral relations between Japan and Syria, cooperation in economic and technical fields, cultural exchange, peace in the Middle East, and the Iran-Iraq conflict.
July 26, 1985
In a letter to Secretary of State Schultz, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Abe describes his visits with various countries in the Middle East after the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference with Dialogue Partners. He discusses the Iran-Iraq conflict, the American hostages held in Lebanon, and the general issue of peace in the Middle East.
This draft message to Secretary of State Schultz from a Japanese government official summarizes a series of trips to countries in the Middle East and appeals to the United States to assist in obtaining peace in the Middle East.
September 15, 1981
Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.
June 7, 1981
After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.
August 13, 1982
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger openly conveyed his dismay toward the Israeli leadership, expressing his support for the opposition, led by Shimon Peres.
January 8, 1982
In a memorandum for the president from January 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his criticism of Israel’s Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and his tendency of “going public whenever it suits him”.
June 12, 1981
This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.
June 11, 1981
ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
June 9, 1981
NSC staffer Douglas J. Feith took the internal debate on the legitimacy of the raid a step further, stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.” Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continuously refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence and was officially at war with it.