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June 9, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Raymond Tanter, 'Israel's Air Strike on Iraq's Nuclear Facility' The NSC’s Raymond Tanter recommended a “middle course of action,” one which would distance Washington from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”
June 15, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’ Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.
June 9, 1981	Cable, American Embassy Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State, ‘Israeli Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility: Background for the Decision’ While starting to construct the political strategy of response to the raid, the administration came face to face with what U.S. ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis called in his cable to Washington a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory”, as assessments regarding Israel’s intention to launch a strike were not passed on from the Carter administration.
June 11, 1981	Cable from Indian Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.
June 15, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Richard V. Allen, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’ National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”
June 11, 1981	Telegram from Washington Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Evron-the President' The Israelis were concerned and disappointed by the administration’s initial response to the raid, which consisted of a freeze on the shipment of F-16 jets to Israel until a legal review was conducted. The Israeli ambassador to Washington conveyed this sentiment to President Reagan in a meeting on 11 June 1980 in this telegram.
June 11, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Robert M Kimmitt, Subject: Israeli Strike -- Legal Aspects This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.
June 10, 1981	Telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.
June 10, 1981	Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, Subject: Evron-Haig The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.
June 9, 1981	Telegram from Washington Embassay to Foreign Office, Subject: administration response Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who maintained close ties with the Israeli diplomats, told the Israeli ambassador in a phone conversation on 9 June 1981 that Israel’s action in Baghdad caused a serious complication for the U.S., reiterating that “President Reagan thinks the same”.