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September 26, 1985
This telegram to the Foreign Minister from Ambassador Kuroda of Japan summarizes US Secretary of State Shultz and Minister Abe’s options on a recent visit to Japan by Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir.
August 16, 1985
A telegram from Ambassador Matsunaga to the Foreign Minister describing President Reagan and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Raphel's response to briefings about Special Envoy Nakayama's visit to Iran and Syria to discuss the American hostages held in Lebanon.
August 12, 1985
A telegram from Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Shara on the future of the relationship between Japan and Syria and the American hostages held in Lebanon.
A telegram from Japanese Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and President Assad about the relationship between Syria and Japan and the American hostages in Lebanon.
August 8, 1985
A telegram from Japanese diplomat Ryuichi Tanabe to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani about the American hostages in Lebanon. Special Envoy Nakayama is delivering a letter from Prime Minister Nakasone.
September 15, 1981
Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.
June 7, 1981
After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.
August 13, 1982
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger openly conveyed his dismay toward the Israeli leadership, expressing his support for the opposition, led by Shimon Peres.
January 8, 1982
In a memorandum for the president from January 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his criticism of Israel’s Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and his tendency of “going public whenever it suits him”.
June 12, 1981
This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.