Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

Evaluation of vulnerability to Soviet aggression due to Italy’s geographic location (the middle of the Mediterranean Ocean) and political position (mostly communist). Reporting on the decision to increase nuclear weapons as well as bolster the air force in order to protect Italy and surrounding Mediterranean countries, which becomes essential considering the Soviet Union has made open threats directed at Europe and NATO.

Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Romano, shares his reflections on the change in Soviet SDI strategy. Romano's analysis underlines the politically fragile and potentially dangerous situation that could emerge as the result of nuclear disarmament in Europe.

The document analyzes the state of East-West relations in the aftermath of the Reykjavik Summit. There appears to be an openness to continuing dialogue by both sides, but many unknowns still persist regarding Europe and the Middle East.

An analysis of the Reykjavik Summit touches on the impetus of the two parties, the outcome of the negotiations, and their possible implications for Italy.

Brief overview of the debate among NATO states regarding the drastic changes in Soviet foreign policy and their effects on European security and the alliance.

The telegram decribes West Germany's reactions on Gorbachev's December 7, 1988 address at the UN where he announces drastic changes in Soviet foreign and security policy.

An analysis of the state of East-West relations. The document covers US-USSR relations, CSCE, euro-Soviet relations, and USSR internal developments.

Secretary of State, George P. Schultz analyzes US position following the collapse of the US-Soviet talks in Reykjavik. He discusses credibility of nuclear deterrence, US commitment to Europe and increasing conventional forces.