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Assad, Hafez

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The Six-Day War (1967)

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ACRS Oral History Project

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June 2007	About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo. Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit. To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.
August 1, 1967	Letter, Walter Ulbricht to Leonid Brezhnev Ulbricht writes to Brezhnev about the delegation to the UAR, led by Mr. Weiss. Ulbricht assesses the political situation in the UAR with respect to Nasser and the weak situation of the Arab Socialist Union. Ulbricht also informs Brezhnev about the situation in the SAR, which seems to be worsening due to a lack of concepts for postwar recovery. Ulbricht suggests sending economic and political experts in order to strengthen the cooperation between the UAR, the SAR and the socialist countries.
November 3, 1973	Letter from Erich Honecker to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad Honecker announces the delivery of arms to the Syrian Arab Republic.
October 1969	Letter, Walter Ulbricht to the General Secretary of the CPSU, Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev Ulbricht expresses his consent for the measures proposed by the Soviet leadership. He underlines the demand for an Israeli withdrawal and points out that otherwise it would be necessary to lead a war of attrition against the Israeli occupation forces. The participation of volunteers from the socialist countries would be necessary, but would require further consideration.
January 13, 1970	Telegram from Walter Ulbricht to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev Ulbricht informs Brezhnev about his visit to the UAR following an invitation from Nasser. He also says that he wants to get in contact with the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to establish a common line to present to the UAR. Ulbricht also announces a visit to the SAR and Iraq.
November 3, 1973	Letter from GDR Leader Erich Honecker to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad Letter from Erich Honecker to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad expressing the GDR's opposition to the Israeli occupation of land acquired during the 1967 Six-Day War, and enumerating the military equipment which had recently been delivered to Syria from the GDR.
October 1973	Letter from Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to GDR State Council Chairman Willi Stoph Undated letter from Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to GDR State Council Chairman Willi Stoph requesting support in conflict with Israel
October 1973	Draft letter from Willi Stoph to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in response to al-Assad's 6 and 10 October 1973 letters to Stoph Draft letter from Willi Stoph to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad condemning Israel's aggression against Syria.
July 11, 1968	Minutes of Conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Brijuni, Croatia Minutes of conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser with occasional input from advisors. Nasser describes the situation in the Middle East, including Egypt's relations with the United States and fighting along the Suez Canal. The two leaders also discuss UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring's recent activities. Tito closes with a recount of his visit to Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and Moscow and an update of the Yugoslav economy.
June 2007	A Directive from the Centre. Folder 79. The Chekist Anthology. This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.” “Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies. In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.