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Pakistan. Embassy (China)

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Bandung Conference 1955

Bandung Conference, 1955

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Pervez, Arshad Z.

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China. Embassy (Pakistan)

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Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad

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June 11, 1981	Lewis A. Dunn, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 'Implications for US Policy of a Pakistani Nuclear Test' Memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggests that the prospects for dissuading a Pakistani nuclear test were dimming and suggests possible U.S. responses should detonate a device.
April 9, 1981	Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation' Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.
March 23, 1981	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan and the US: Seeking Ways to Improve Relations' A State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report on the desire of the Pakistani leadership to improve relations with the U.S. and negotiate a more substantial aid package. The report warns against becoming too close to General Zia, as close relations with him “might harm future relations” should he be swept from power.
January 31, 1980	Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith, enclosing excerpts from memoranda of conversations with Geng Biao and Deng Xiaoping. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an immediate impact on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet resistance through Islamabad. With these considerations, the U.S. chose to “set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being.”
September 8, 1979	Anthony Lake, director, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of State Vance, 'The Pakistan strategy and Future Choices' Anthony Lake, director of the Policy Planning Staff, writes to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about available options to deter Pakistan’s further proliferation while still maintaining “good relations.” Lake suggests exploring the idea of pressuring groups and countries providing aid to Pakistan, and wonders whether the sale of F-16 fighter-jets could sway Pakistan’s military to scale back their nuclear effort.
June 6, 1979	US Department of State Cable 145139 to US Embassy India [Repeating Cable Sent to Embassy Pakistan], 'Non-Proliferation in South [Asia]' U.S. State Department cable states that the Carter administration has “reached a dead end” in its efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear technology in South Asia. The State Department is wary of taking too strong an approach to Pakistan’s nuclear endeavors, given the security ties between the two countries and concerns about Pakistan’s stability.
June 26, 1972	US Mission Geneva Cable 2755 to State Department, 'Japanese-Pakistani Conversations Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans' Report on conversations between Japanese officials and a Pakistani source who indicated the location of the upcoming Indian nuclear test. The cable expressed doubts about the information, suggesting that the "stir" "may have been created largely on personal basis" by the Pakistani source.
January 14, 1972	State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?' The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.
June 2007	An Illegal Trainer (KGB history of agent "Halef"). Folder 60. The Chekist Anthology. Describes training techniques used by the KGB in logistical preparation of their operatives for assignments abroad. This article focuses on the employment history of the KGB agent codenamed “Halef.” Between 1955 and 1967, Halef was stationed in Hong Kong and Tokyo. In 1967, due to his insignificant feedback and a weak performance as a field operative, Halef was transferred back as a trainer. As a trainer, Halef traveled extensively. While in the United States, the KGB developed a fictitious identity for Halef – a so-called legend-biography – in case his activity aroused suspicion and he were detained by authorities. In the United States, France and Mexico, Halef’s objectives included developing and testing means of communication with the KGB, which could be used to inform the KGB of an operative’s arrival to and departure from a country, request a meeting, or announce an emergency. In addition to assessing the existing signal language used among operatives, the KGB also instructed Halef to collect the data necessary to set up new surveillance locations in a number of countries. In 1977, Halef was performing assignments in Pakistan and Burma. In 1978, he and his wife were engaged in assignments throughout the USSR. From the USSR, they were relocated to the GDR and then to Bulgaria, where they boarded a cruise ship going from Varny to Suhumi to survey the ports of the Black Sea basin. Traveling through Odessa, Halef photographed military vessels and observed the procedures of the border patrol and customs officers.
December 28, 1956	Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.