Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

Vietnam Clear All

Related Resources

The Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum in Hanoi, Vietnam, 2012.

Southeast Asia

Vietnam

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Photograph of a US POW during the Vietnam War.

Vietnam War

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

South Korean Diplomacy in Asia, 1955-1957

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Southeast Asia

Cambodia

Conversations with Zhou Enlai

Sino-Soviet Relations

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Choi, Duk Shin (Choe Deok-sin)

1914- 1989

North Vietnamese Decision-Making, 1973-1975

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Rhee, Syngman

1875- 1965

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Portrait of DRV leader Pham Van Dong, 1972.

Phạm, Văn Đồng (Pham Van Dong)

1906- 2000

Deng Xiaoping, 1979.

Deng, Xiaoping

1904- 1997

Results:

1 - 10 of 911

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

March 7, 1968	Record of Conversation between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu on 7 March 1968 A record of a conversation in which Brezhnev and Ceausescu discuss weather or not to say that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will only be signed once the United States ends its actions in Vietnam. Brezhnev advises not to raise the issue, while Ceausescu claims that it must be stated in order to advance a solution towards disarmament.
February 26, 1971	From the Journal of M.G. Podol’sky, 'Record of a Conversation with R. Berthold, Counsellor of the GDR Embassy in Hanoi, 18 February 1971' A Soviet official in Vietnam recounts a meeting with an East German diplomat. The two sides discussed the nuclear threats from the United States in the Vietnam War, as well as relations with China.
2003	Tran Quang Co: A Memoir The memoir of Trần Quang Cơ (1927-2015), former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), brings to light the intense diplomacy among great powers and regional players over the continued conflicts in Indochina after the unification of Vietnam as well as the bitter disagreements within the Vietnamese leadership over the country’s political priorities during the period of 1975-1993. Cơ put together his memories and thoughts on “many sensitive developments” in Vietnamese foreign relations that he believed had been “intentionally or unintentionally” forgotten (rơi rụng) in the state-endorsed history “to ‘smooth over’ (tròn trĩnh) the historical record.” Completed in Vietnamese in 2001 (updated in 2003) and informally circulated on the internet, Merle Pribbenow’s English-translation makes this valuable historical source available to wider audiences.
April 1984	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Briefing Material for the President's Trip to China' Includes memoranda on "China's Independent Foreign Policy in Perspective," "The Foreign Policy Positions of China's Senior Leaders," "Deng-Zhao with Brzezinski--An Assessment," "Sino-Soviet Relations," "China and a Korean Dialogue," "Sino-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations," "China and Japan: Building for the Long Haul," "China's Taiwan Policy," "China-Southeast Asia," "China: Leadership and Succession," "China: Economic Reforms," "US-China Economic Relations," "China: Expanding Market for US Energy Firms," "China: Nuclear Power Prospects," and "China: Changes in Military Industrial Development Policy-Implications for the United States."
May 1, 1954	Current Intelligence Bulletin, 1 May 1954 A heavily redacted copy of the CIA's "Current Intelligence Bulletin" for May 1, 1954. Released sections include "Soviet diplomat urges immediate cease-fire in Indochina" and "[Syngman] Rhee reported dis leased with Chiang Kai-shek." Four other sections were withheld in their entirety.
December 2, 1980	Politburo Resolution No. 31-NQ/TW on the Protecting Political Security and Maintaining Law and Order in Our Society in the New Situation In response to this perceived growing threat against the regime, on 2 December 1980 the Vietnamese Communist Party Politburo issued Resolution 31-NQ/TW on maintaining internal political security and law and order in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with a specific focus on increasing the power and the responsibilities of Vietnam’s Public Security and Police forces, which were subordinate to the Ministry of Interior.
December 15, 1980	Speech Given by Comrade Le Duc Tho to the Leaders of Public Security’s Departments, Bureaus, and City and Provincial Offices during the Conference to Discuss the Three Specialized Drafts and to Implement Politburo Resolution 31 [Excerpts] A speech given by Party Politburo Member Le Duc Tho during a three-day conference of the Ministry’s top Public Security officers along with the Directors of Public Security of all of the nation’s provinces and major cities, where the attendees received instructions on three new Ministry of Interior Party resolutions - one on “the struggle against Chinese spies”, one on “the struggle against American spies”, and one on “the struggle against the enemy’s ideological attacks.” At the time of the speech, Le Duc Tho was viewed as Vietnam’s second most powerful leader, second only to Party General Secretary Le Duan. Le Duc Tho commented that while recruiting Americans would be easy, requiring only “money, women, and drinking and carousing”, recruiting Chinese would require a careful process of political education of the target
December 15, 1980	Resolution on the Status and Mission of Combatting Enemy’s Ideological Sabotage Efforts During This New Period This resolution on combatting “ideological sabotage” lumps Chinese ideological propaganda, Western propaganda operations, international human rights and humanitarian relief activities, and religious radio broadcasts and religious missionary activities all together with the spreading influence of Western culture and music in Vietnam as part of a vast, insidious effort by Vietnam’s enemies designed to corrupt Vietnam’s society and to weaken its “revolutionary” spirit in order to cause the overthrow or collapse of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government. The over-the-top rhetoric used in this resolution illustrates the widespread paranoia that infected the upper ranks of Vietnam’s Party and security apparatus during this period of the Cold War. It was not until six years later, in December 1986, that the pressures of growing internal dissension (even within the Party), the country’s desperate economic situation, and reductions in Soviet military and economic to Vietnam resulted in the decision by the Communist Party’s 6th Party Congress to shift to a policy of reforms, called “Renovation” [Đổi Mới] reforms and to new Vietnamese efforts to normalize relations with China and the United States.
December 15, 1980	Resolution on Policy Guidelines and Missions for the Struggle against American Spies in the New Situation A resolution on combatting “American spies." The document calls for Public Security to re-interview all confirmed or suspected “CIA” agents being held in re-education camps and to conduct careful reviews of the enormous volume of documents captured by Communist forces when they took over South Vietnam in 1975 in order to identify and arrest any “stay-behind” agents of the Americans as well as former “CIA” agents who had still managed to evade detection and arrest.
December 15, 1980	Resolution on Policy Guidelines and Missions for the Struggle against Chinese Spies in the New Situation A resolution on combatting “Chinese spies” in Vietnam. The resolution directs Vietnam's Public Security to establish a special interrogation center to which all known and suspected “Chinese spies” who had been arrested would be sent for detailed interrogation by trained professionals. The interrogations would help Vietnam to identify existing Chinese espionage operations and to obtain information on the Chinese intelligence organizations, their plans, and their targets.