Because the Warsaw Pact has recently conducted a large number of military exercises and the costs of doing so, and given the present military occupation of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky proposes postponing the October joint military exercise to the following year. Yakubovsky solicits Polish General Jaruzelski's opinion on the matter.

Following the successful completion of the first stage of the joint military exercise in Czechoslovakia, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky gives orders to Polish General Jaruzelski concerning the second stage. Four specific orders are given: the Polish military leadership must maintain friendly relations with the political bodies and civilians of occupied Czechoslovakia; maintain military preparedness; ensure the maintenance of proper living conditions for the Polish troops; and maintain adequate food supply and medical support for the Polish troops.

In August 1968 a small group of pro-Moscow hardliners in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, led by Vasil Bilak, wrote two letters requesting urgent assistance from the Soviet Union to thwart the imminent "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia. Both letters were addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and both were written in Russian to ensure that they would be read promptly. The first (and more important) letter was signed by Bilak and four of his colleagues: Drahomir Kolder, Alois Indra, Oldrich Svestka, and Antonin Kapek. Brezhnev later used the letter as a formal justification for the impending military invasion of Czechoslovakia.

A review of the 10-12 March meeting during which the CC International Departments discussed the China issue. A great deal of time was spent discussing whether or not China was still a socialist country. A "Protocol Note" was unanimously adopted as a result of the meeting.

Memorandum from Chief of General Staff II General Oliwa to Chief of General Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defense, General Chocha. General Oliwa is sending a note from the Military Attaché in Prague assessing the events in Czechoslovakia from 28 July to 5 August 1968. The status of the party and public opinion on the party in Czechoslovakia is highlighted throughout.

General Pavlovsky writes to the Commander of the Polish Second Army, Brigadier General Florian Siwicki. He lists preliminary steps in Operation Danube where the troops enter from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

Report given out by the Polish Army General Staff regarding the state of Polish combat troops for the intervention in Czechoslovakia. States that the armies are in full readiness and are ready to move toward Czechoslovakia at any time. An overview of the area in Czechoslovakia that they are invading is also given at length.

Report states that Polish Second Army divisions are in good spirits and believe their mission to intervene in Czechoslovakia is a just cause. Report states that despite the good will of Polish soldiers, they face hostility from the Czech army and citizens alike. Report then states what actions should be undertaken.

Report states there are no problems with the morale and political state of soldiers and officers of the Second Army, though the soldiers have faced open hostility from Czech citizens. Overall relations between Czech Army and Polish divisions are negative.

Report on the use of propaganda materials and how they have been distributed in Czech cities and villages. It also lists several incidents of hostility expressed by Czech soldiers/citizens towards Warsaw Pact soldiers.