1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
East Asia
1898- 1976
Southeast Asia
South Asia
1893- 1976
North America
1949-
-
1894- 1971
June 9, 1965
The Chinese Embassy in Moscow reports responses to the second Chinese nuclear test among Soviet news agencies, upper and middle class citizens, and students.
May 15, 1965
The Chinese Embassy in Moscow reports reactions from students and military personnel in the USSR to China's second nuclear test.
May 17, 1965
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union describing positive responses of Soviet officials and the foreign missions regarding China's second successful nuclear test.
October 22, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the United Arab Republic [Egypt] describing a positive conversation between Chinese Ambassador Chen Jiakang and Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic Mahmoud Riad on China's testing of an Atomic Bomb.
October 20, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam entails positive responses of Le Duan, Pham Hùng and Ly Ban regarding China's first testing of an Atomic Bomb.
October 18, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia describing positive responses from Indonesian government officials and foreign government officials in Indonesia regarding China's nuclear test.
October 19, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Algeria describes positive responses of foreign government officials stationed in Algeria on China's first nuclear weapons test.
May 19, 1965
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan describes different responses of Pakistani government officials and foreign government diplomats in Pakistan regarding China's first nuclear weapons test.
October 16, 1964
The Government of China announces its successful nuclear test but states that it will follow a no first use policy and in fact desires for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
May 30, 1967
A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”
