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"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

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Ball, George W.

1909- 1994

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Dulles, John Foster

1888- 1959

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Strauss, Franz Josef

1915- 1988

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McCone, John A. (John Alex)

1902- 1991

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Rusk, Dean

1909- 1994

South African Nuclear History

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March 10, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger' To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”
March 1, 1967	Gottfried William Moser, ACDA/Bureau of International Relations, 'Consultations with the FRG' In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.
February 22, 1967	US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations' As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”
January 17, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn and Soviet Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters' Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”
January 13, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between ACDA Director William C. Foster and West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'Draft Articles of Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with draft treaty attached In this conversation, ACDA director Foster met with Ambassador Knappstein for an extended discussion of the NPT. Topics included the treaty’s compatibility with a future European federation, consultations by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the definition of a nuclear weapon, and the prohibition of national control over “peaceful nuclear explosives.”
December 29, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation with West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'German Concern Over Draft NPT Text' In this conversation, Ambassador Knappstein expressed concern over the draft of the NPT that Washington and Moscow had agreed on. Knappstein worried that the draft articles would foreclose “all of the available options for participation in nuclear defense."
November 28, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director ACDA, and Leonard S. Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary, 'Revised Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty,' enclosing Memorandum for the President, 'Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty' Further review on the proposed NPT by ACDA and State Department lawyers in this report concluded that the language would “not disturb existing bilateral relationships,” that is, arrangements to provide U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in NATO countries for the use of West German forces and other allies in the event of war.
November 26, 1966	Message to the President from Secretary Rusk In this message, Secretary Rusk reported to President Johnson that the Soviet non-transfer principle, which ruled out MLF-type arrangements but left open other alternatives, was a “good formulation” that would be “acceptable” to the incipient West German “Grand Coalition” government.
October 17, 1966	US Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Harlan Cleveland, 'Notes on Washington Trip' In the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Harlen Cleveland's notes on his meeting with Secretary Rusk, Cleveland details Rusk's thoughts about Soviet interest in the NPT. According to the Secretary, the “Soviets should have no real difficulty in finding a common interest with us in signing a treaty which enshrines [the] two self-denying provisions” of no-transfer to non-nuclear weapons states and “no relinquishment of control by the US over US warheads.”
September 23, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the President, enclosing 'Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation' In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of “pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities.”