This report recounts developments at the UN First Committee from the beginning of the special session, April 24, to the plenary vote on June 12, 1968. Among the interesting observations was how the “most important resistance cell had … surprisingly developed among the Black African states,” who had sought concessions from the United States on apartheid South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa (modern-day Namibia). The report notes the various changes forced on the superpowers by Italy and Mexico on behalf of the non-nuclear-weapon delegations. The aide-memoire concluded that “[a]lthough these concessions [were] more apparent than real, they served as a pretext for a number of delegations, under intense Soviet and American pressure, to go along with the draft resolution thus revised.” The French delegate to the United Nations, Armand Berard, explained to the General Assembly on June 12 the reasons for France’s abstention. In accordance with Francis Perrin’s recommendations, Berard elaborated that although France would not sign the NPT when “the real issue was effective nuclear disarmament,” it would nonetheless pledged to behave “[e]xactly in such a way as those States which opt to adhere to it.”

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

Responding to a request from Michael Palliser (Wilson's Private Secretary for foreign affairs), the Foreign Office's seasoned Europe-watcher Derek Day argued that the government needed to balance three – sometimes conflicting – UK interests. First, there was the position as a European power, particularly with regard to the ongoing EEC application. Second, there was the UK's status as a nuclear power, in which the UK shared “special responsibilities” with the US, exemplified by the UK's acquisition of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as its primary nuclear deterrent. Third, there was the desire to see a non-proliferation treaty concluded, which sometimes meant disagreement with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Day contended that the United Kingdom seemed to have been successful in positioning itself as understanding European anxieties, with Bonn having congratulated Wilson's administration on bring “good Europeans.” Day's assessment was seen and lauded by Wilson, who hoped that it was correct.

Alfonso Garcia Robles explained how the Mexican delegation tried to gather the support of the Latin American countries for the NPT draft. These countries prepared and presented modifications to the NPT text, and the United States and the Soviet Union accepted some of these proposals. Garcia Robles reported that the Argentinian and Brazilian representatives said they recognized the value of the NPT but would not support it if it kept its clause prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions. The Ambassador also reported the Soviet positive reactions toward the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Garcia Robles recounted the skepticism of some delegations toward the NPT. He recommended not to sign the NPT in 1968 unless the Soviet Union signed Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which includes negative security assurances.

This document contains a list of directives to the Soviet delegation at the 23rd Session of the UNGA which focus on a Soviet government memorandum that was submitted by the Soviet government for addition to the session's agenda. The initial directives instruct the delegation to emphasize the urgency that, to the Soviet government, befits the serious need to terminate the arms race and start making concrete steps towards disarmament. Later directives call attention to discussions held between the Soviet government and those of other socialist countries, as well as additions to the resolution of the UNGA proposed by Western countries that the Soviet government finds unacceptable. Nonetheless, the delegation is to bring the Memorandum to the attention of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENCD) for consideration.

Gromyko asks U Thant to include the "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on Some Urgent Measures to End the Arms Race and Disarmament" on the agenda of the 23rd Session of the UNGA. He also extolls the signing of the NPT as an opportunity to create better conditions for the termination of the arms race and as a starting point for further international agreements on the issues of disarmament and the termination of the usage of nuclear weapons. Gromyko also asks Thant to share the Memorandum in the capacity of an official document on the UNGA.

This memo contains a list of items on the agenda in preparation for the XXIII Session of the General Assembly. Some of the listed items on the agenda include instructing Gromyko to put the "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on Some Urgent Measures to End the Arms Race and Disarmament" on the agenda of the 23rd Session of the UNGA and approve the directives of the delegation of the USSR to the 23rd Session of the UNGA. This memo also includes a list of logistical preparations for the Soviet delegation, including approving a list of advisers and experts for the Soviet delegation, as well as means of transportation to the 23rd Session in New York for the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belarussian SSR, and potentially the Mongolian SR upon request.

Sent to the Soviet representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, this document lists the nations to which the representative must pay the most attention at the UN meeting. The document also underlines how the Soviet representative should speak with members of the American delegation in reference to any diplomatic collaboration on the NPT.

A resolution from the CPSU CC about the location at which the NPT will be signed. The resolution approves the guidelines for Soviet delegates at the 22nd session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Note asking that Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyy, Mazurov, Gromyko confirm the draft of directives to the USSR Delegation at the XXIII session of the UN General Assembly.