Zhou Enlai and Stalin discuss Soviet assistance for the Chinese economy and military.

An excerpt of a document recovered from the Air India 101 crash assessing China's military capabilities.

Mao requests from the Soviet government 3,000 tons ammonal, 24 million blasting caps, and 9.6 million meters of safety fuse. He asks that these things be supplied February-March, in two parts.

Stalin informs Mao that the Soviets are able to deliver 10 torpedo boats, 83 aircrafts - of which 32 are torpedo bombers TU-2, 35 are LA-11 fighter aircrafts -, 26 guns (37 mm), 8 guns (180mm), and ammunition. As for advisors, they're able to send an additional three.

A proposal of how many guns and ammunition can be given to the Chinese troops and at what rate.

Stalin informs Mao that his request was impossible to complete at the time, but that the Soviet government is able to send 600,000 units of ammunition and 332 guns. The ammunition will be supplied monthly from January-April, 150,000 each month. The guns will also be supplied monthly from January-February, 166 guns each month.

An application for military goods for 1953, a request for urgently needed military goods, and an application for materials for military production.

Telegram stating that it would be impossible to fulfill Mao's request on supplying arms and resources for a certain number of divisions, and that fulfilling even a fifth of his request (which they did) was difficult.

Telegram from Stalin to Mao discussing the five advisors being sent to Beijing, and the military equipment being sent by the end of 1951 for the remaining six divisions -- the delivery of which is being delayed six months.

Telegram from Stalin to Mao stating that because of the conditions of production and transportation, it is almost impossible to ensure additional supplies (in the amount of the proposed one-fifth of the value of all applications from the September 8 telegram), and at the same time supply six infantry divisions with arms and equipment by the end of the year. Stalin states that they can take Mao's additional order on the delivery of military equipment in 1951, equal to one-fifth of the total cost of China's application, only on the condition that the supply of weapons and equipment for the six divisions are postponed for six months.