The telegram notifies the White House reaching an interim agreement with Japan that authorizes Tokai Mura to reprocess fifty more tons of spent fuel to keep the plant operating in exchange of Japan not making any attempts toward establishing a new reprocessing plant before 1 June 1981.

The briefing paper describes the Japanese government's reprocessing ability and desire to build the second reprocessing plant to fuel experimental breeder reactor. The State Department wants to resolve safeguards requirements for reprocessing in Japan but agrees that an interim agreement could be reached.

The telegram shows the State Department requesting the US Embassy in Tokyo to learn more about Japanese thinking on a second reprocessing plant and why Japanese MITI and JAERIA held different views on this issue.

The memorandum describing Ambassador Smith's thinking about an improved nonproliferation regime to Director General Yatabe.

The telegram describes the US Embassy in Tokyo reporting Japan's criticism of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 but its unwillingess to be strongly opposed in fear of a cut-off in enrichment services and nuclear reactor components.

The memorandum questions Director General Yatabe's certainty about the second reprocessing plant, citing a conclusion of Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute's draft report that Japan does not need the second plant.

The memorandum describes Ambassador Smith's meeting with Director General Yatabe regarding reprocessing of US origin materials and second reprocessing plant.

The memorandum contains Cristopher's analysis of advantages and risks to Ambassador Smith's proceeding with post-INFCE explorations.

The memorandum describing Smith's argument that President Carter's nonproliferation policy of making distinctions between countries over reprocessing is discriminatory.

The memorandum describing the discussion on extention of the Tokai-Mura agreement and State Department officials' opinions.