Description of a meeting between Angolan and South African delegations, the former being led by Venancio De Moura. Details discussion of troop withdrawal from Namibia, focusing on an "outburst" by De Moura.

Chester Crocker writes to R. F. "Pik" Botha about the importance of not responding to the recent Cuban/Angolan communique. Crocker warns against giving the Cubans an excuse to keep their troops stationed in Namibia, and points out that it is likely a distraction for concessions the Cubans and Angolans are about to make to South Africa and the United States.

Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedalé" was the defense minister of Angola; General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola; General Polo Cintra Frías was the head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola

Message from R. F. "Pik" Botha declaring that, despite SWAPO incursions into Namibia, South African forces have not retaliated, in order to give the maximum amount of time for Angola to make good on its promise to withdraw its forces. South Africa will, however, maintain a military presence in Namibia while he threat is still there.

A defense of Cuban military intervention in Angola, citing the advance of South African troops in Angolan territory as justifiable cause. Accuses the United States and South Africa of inciting bands of Namibian militia to upset the Cuban presence in Angola. Argues that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is an agreement between two sovereign governments.

Excerpts of a statement by P.W. Botha discussing South Africa's concern with the independence and security of its neighbors. Emphasizes South Africa's wish and ability to provide Namibia with continued money and infrastructure and warns against the threat that a Marxist Namibia would pose to the free world.

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

A Cuban Defense Ministry communiqué details the “heroic defense” by Cuban and Angolan troops of Cuito Cuanavale against a South African onslaught. The brunt of the fighting was done by local Angolan forces, which successfully managed to repel the South African invaders.

A telegram from United States Interests Section in Havana to Secretary of State Shultz describing Cuban reactions to reports that UNITA captured the strategic Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale, capital city of Cuando Cubango. Cuban press call such claims false and lies of the racist South Africans.

Telegram from United States Interests Section in Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz describing the placement of Cuban forces in Angola and the justification that they are not taking part in active combat.