Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

NATO's Deputy Secretary General Marcello Guidi writes to Foreign Minister Andreotti at the end of his term volunteering his rather optimistic views on the developments in East-West relations and NATO during the past three years. Key topics include disarmament, the German question, and the future role of NATO.

Italy's permanent representative to NATO, Fulci, writes to foreign minister Andreotti following NATO's 1989 Wintex-Cimex exercise. His analysis suggests that the exercise revealed inefficincies in NATO's deterrence and flexible response strategy,

The telegram compiles updates from Defence Ministers (UK, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy) on the status of deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles decided in December 1979.

Telegram from Italy's permanent representative to NATO re-caps the controversial position presented by the Supreme Allied Commander Rogers. General Rogers criticizes the Reagan administration's strategy and expresses concern over the disparity between NATO capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact.

The document discusses the internal debate caused by Schultz's address at the Atlantic Council of Ministers. NATO countries are divided into two camps regarding the strategy and pace of nuclear disarmament and reduction talks.

Secretary of State, George P. Schultz analyzes US position following the collapse of the US-Soviet talks in Reykjavik. He discusses credibility of nuclear deterrence, US commitment to Europe and increasing conventional forces.

Italy's pemanent representative to NATO, Vincenzo Tornetta, reports to foreign minister Colombo about the prospects of NATO's 1980s defence strategy. He offers an overview of the developments of the Alliance, and discusses topical questions including euromissiles and anti-war movements in Europe, and calls for increased openness and willingness to negotiate with the East.

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”