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Documents

August 16, 1985

Cable No. 6170, Ambassador Matsunaga to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages'

A telegram from Ambassador Matsunaga to the Foreign Minister describing President Reagan and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Raphel's response to briefings about Special Envoy Nakayama's visit to Iran and Syria to discuss the American hostages held in Lebanon.

August 12, 1985

Cable No. 664, Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Second Meeting of Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Shara)'

A telegram from Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign Minister Shara on the future of the relationship between Japan and Syria and the American hostages held in Lebanon.

August 12, 1985

Cable No. 663, Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting of Special Envoy Nakayama and President Assad)'

A telegram from Japanese Ambassador Kato to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and President Assad about the relationship between Syria and Japan and the American hostages in Lebanon.

August 8, 1985

Cable No. 1373, Charge d’Affaires Tanabe to the Foreign Minister, 'Problem of the Release of the American Hostages (Meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani)'

A telegram from Japanese diplomat Ryuichi Tanabe to the Foreign Minister summarizing a meeting between Special Envoy Nakayama and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani about the American hostages in Lebanon. Special Envoy Nakayama is delivering a letter from Prime Minister Nakasone.

September 15, 1981

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Instructions for the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's annual General Conference (GC) which told them to anticipate a “severe attack” against Israel by objecting “vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.” Later on, this instruction would change, and the delegation would be instructed to leave the building should the Israeli credentials be rejected.

June 7, 1981

Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre, 7 June 1981: Statement by the Director General

After the raid Israel initiated a PR campaign, explaining its reasoning behind the attack. Following this campaign, the second causality of the raid, in addition to Iraq’s reactor, was the credibility of the IAEA. And its officials staged their own counter campaign.

August 13, 1982

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Secretary Weinberger, ‘Weekly Report of Defense Activities’

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger openly conveyed his dismay toward the Israeli leadership, expressing his support for the opposition, led by Shimon Peres.

January 8, 1982

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Secretary Weinberger, ‘Weekly Report to the President’

In a memorandum for the president from January 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed his criticism of Israel’s Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and his tendency of “going public whenever it suits him”.

June 12, 1981

Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., ‘U.S. Strategy for UN Security Council Meeting on the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility’

This document outlines Haig's proposed political strategy, which was approved by Reagan on 12 June, and was constructed around the notion of red lines: Washington would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment” by Israel.

June 11, 1981

Memorandum for the National Security Council from Richard V. Allen, ‘National Security Council Meeting (NSC), Friday, June 12, 1981, 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.’

ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

Pagination