Abreu reports a conversation in which ambassador Camillión revealed President Videla’s desire to visit Brazil, implying that Itaipu was a sensitive issue, but of domestic nature. The Argentine government suggested a joint declaration on nuclear issues to turn away international suspicions on "the production of the bomb."

This is a document containing talking points for Secretary of State Alexander Haig's meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Topics addressed in the document include: Chinese exportation of uranium and heavy water to South Africa and Argentina; the intention to suspend the prohibition of arm sales to China; greater nuclear and security cooperation; the increase in Chinese arm sales to countries dependent on the Soviet Union; and the desire to open a new consulate in Shenyang.

This CIA bulletin notes the failure of U.S.-Argentine nuclear negotiations after Cyrus Vance’s visit to Argentina in December 1977. The U.S. proposed to supply highly enriched uranium for Argentina’s reactor exported to Peru, as well as to approve of a heavy water plant from Canada and asked in exchange for the Argentine ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty as well as the deferral of their spent-fuel reprocessing plans.

This telegram made by the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, verifies U.S. pressure on Argentina’s nuclear program, especially through Canada, with whom Argentina had a strategic partnership in the nuclear field. The telegram goes into depth on factors that underlie Argentina's decision not to sign the NPT, and its efforts to import the materials necessary for its nuclear program.

This estimate is an update of the1984 SNIE, and has more specific considerations on the Alfonsin government and its nuclear policies, capabilities and intentions.

This document reveals an encounter between a U.S. State Department official and an Argentine diplomat in Washington D.C., in which the U.S. diplomat suggests to his Argentine counterpart that the U.S. government would warmly welcome an initiative by Argentina and Brazil regarding mutual inspections as well as a declaration renouncing the right to develop peaceful nuclear explosives.

This is a note from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, to Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel, regarding India’s nuclear test in 1974. It indicates the main consequences of the Indian test to both the world and Brazil, and suggests that Argentina has the necessary incentives to follow India’s path.

According to the 1985 report, the Argentines “have achieved at least a proof of principle of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion.” In other words, they had a workable system. Nevertheless, the enrichment plant would not be “fully operational until 1987-1988.” While the assessment of Argentine interest in nuclear weapons did not change, CIA analysts asserted that “Argentina continues to develop the necessary facilities and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons development effort.”

Almost two years after the 1982 SNIE, the military rule had collapsed and a democratically-elected government led by Raul Alfonsin was taking an unambiguous stand on nuclear weapons. In its 1984 assessment, the intelligence community was more certain about Argentina’s nuclear policies: “on the basis of discernible evidence … Argentina does not have a program to develop or test nuclear explosives.” Nevertheless, Alfonsin was unlikely to change “Argentina’s long-term efforts to achieve its goal of acquiring a full range of nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities.”

Argentina, like its neighbor, Brazil, was determined to develop an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” with the capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Also like Brazil, Argentina was one of the few Latin American countries to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thus, Argentina’s nuclear activities were under routine scrutiny to see if they involved anything that suggested an interest in a weapons capability. US intelligence agencies continued to monitor developments but perspectives shifted as Argentina’s domestic politics evolved. Prepared after the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands Islands, in which Washington helped London, this special estimate professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions. While “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.”