Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.

National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”

The Israelis were concerned and disappointed by the administration’s initial response to the raid, which consisted of a freeze on the shipment of F-16 jets to Israel until a legal review was conducted. The Israeli ambassador to Washington conveyed this sentiment to President Reagan in a meeting on 11 June 1980 in this telegram.

This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.

The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

The Israeli embassy in Washington learned from Haig as well as from another contact that Secretary of Defense Weinberger supports a tough approach to Israel, including a UNSC resolution that would demand Israel to open the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona for inspection and a call for Israel to join the NPT.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who maintained close ties with the Israeli diplomats, told the Israeli ambassador in a phone conversation on 9 June 1981 that Israel’s action in Baghdad caused a serious complication for the U.S., reiterating that “President Reagan thinks the same”.

On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.

Following Reagan’s election in November 1980, his transition team in charge of nuclear matters called for a clean, dramatic break from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration. As for relations with the IAEA, a vital component of the policy, the ACDA paper argued that Washington should employ the agency as an agent to achieve its nonproliferation goals. The IAEA and the NPT were to be “further strengthened and given greater U.S. support.” To reinforce U.S. influence over the agency, it was recommended that “support to the IAEA in the form of financial contribution, manpower and technical advice should be increased significantly.

In July 1979, U.S. diplomats told their Italian counterparts that it was an “American strong belief” that Iraq was pursuing nuclear capability, and they requested the Italian government to provide information on the nature of the “nuclear supplies” to Iraq. Italy dutifully complied with the United States’ demand for information and assured the US government that all supplies to Iraq were provided in compliance with the "NPT, the London agreements, and the other international regulations”