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Documents

February 9, 1983

Ministry of State Security (Stasi), 'Note About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Mielke] with the Chairman of the KGB, Comrade Chebrikov, in Moscow'

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

January 14, 1983

Ministry of State Security (Stasi), Brief Note, 'Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of the USSR'

This brief note written by the Ministry of State Security includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

July 24, 1989

Decision of the Moldavian KGB Collegium, On the Implementation Status by KGB MSSR Section 5 'Fulfillment of the Directives of the XXVIIth CPSU Congress
on the Intensification of Ideological-Educational Work'

Report by the Moldavian KGB on the decisions it had implemented of the USSR KGB Collegium from the previous year. Includes work to counter Romanian nationalist propaganda. Romania is referred to by the code name "Objective 24." General-Lieutenant G.M. Volkov, the Chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB, maintained that an all-out offensive was required, including the use of “persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art,” in order to neutralize “the subversive activity of the adversary” by identifying and isolating the “emissaries of the adversary” and imposing “permanent and reliable operational control” over them.

December 6, 1978

Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, No. 294s, to President of the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB), Andropov, 'Regarding the Necessity of Increasing the Number of Personnel of the Moldavian SSR KGB'

The Moldavian Communist Party requests an increase in the number of KGB personnel in Moldavia to assist with efforts to "curb subversive activity" originating in Romania. This “ideological subversion” was further propagated by the Romanian print and broadcast media, through direct mailings (mail correspondence having “surpassed 500 thousand letters per year”) and through Romanian citizens visiting the republic who sought to indoctrinate the Soviet people “in an anti-Soviet, anti-Russian spirit."

July 3, 1972

Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, no. 210 s, to CPSU Central Committee, 'Proposal Regarding the Organization of KGB Organs in the Frontier Counties of the Republic'

Request from the Moldavian Communist Party to send KGB officers to Moldavia in light of the “intensification of subversive activities directed against the republic by the special services and ideological centers of the Western countries,” of Israel, and of Romania. Travelers coming from Romania were deemed particularly dangerous because of their efforts “to inculcate our citizens with a nationalist spirit.” A “considerable part of them” smuggled in “materials and literature that are dangerous from the political perspective” while others “propagated the separate course of the Romanian leadership, the idea of breaking off the former Bessarabia from the USSR and uniting it with Romania.”

November 5, 1968

Report Relayed by Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee, 'Students and the Events in Czechoslovakia'

KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov presents a secret, 33-page report to the CPSU Central Committee about the mood of Soviet college students. The report had been completed sometime before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and had been circulating within the KGB. It is not clear precisely who drafted the report, but Andropov’s cover memorandum and the report itself indicate that the author was a college student in Odessa who had recently finished his degree.

June 7, 1960

Note from KGB Chairman A. Shelepin to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Regarding Plan to Discredit CIA Chief Dulles

Shelepin sets out a plan to discredit CIA chief Allen Dulles.

September 26, 1987

Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and Head of the KGB 5th Directorate Abramov

Meeting between the head of the KGB’s Fifth Chief Directorate, Major General Abramov, and Minister for State Security Mielke, especially on changes in Soviet policy following Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power. They discuss the increase in dissident activity, public demonstrations, and subversive organizations.

August 24, 1984

Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984

Memorandum summarizing consultations between the Stasi and KGB over RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear weapon attack”), an intelligence program initiated by the KGB to collect indicators of a potential nuclear first-strike by the US. The KGB had developed a new system for the early detection of war preparations for a first-strike attack, which should provide evidence of such preparations on the basis of “objective” indicators that would be hard to manipulate.

March 31, 1984

KGB Report on New Elements in US Policy toward the European Socialist Countries

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

Pagination