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Documents

June 20, 1967

On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

November 7, 1967

Complaint by [Government of] Brazil Regarding Czechoslovak Transport of Guerrilla Fighters from Cuba to Latin America

Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

November 17, 1967

Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

January 10, 1949

Cable, Stalin to Mao Zedong, Nanjing Peace Proposal

Stalin informs Mao that they received a note from the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing proposing that the Soviet government act as a mediator between the Nanjing government and the Chinese Communist Party in the termination of the ongoing civil war.

June 1960

From the Diary of S. V. Chervonenko, Memorandum of Conversation with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, Deng Xiaoping, 17 May 1960

Deng Xiaoping discuss Khrushchev's speech regarding the American U-2 spy plane shot down by the Soviet Union in May 1960 and the Eisenhower administration's attempted cover up. He also discussed Zhou Enlai's visit to India and continued tensions between India and China.

January 13, 1949

Ciphered Telegrams No. 50450, 50470, and 50490, Terebin to Kuznetsov, transmitting a Message from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]

Mao responds to Stalin's telegrams regarding the Soviet response to the proposal for negotiations from the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing.

January 15, 1949

Ciphered Telegram No. 0356, Filippov [Stalin] to Comrade Mao Zedong

Stalin received Mao's latest telegram; consensus has been reached by the Chinese communist party and the Soviet Union on "peace talks" with the Guomindang.

October 26, 1964

Excerpt, Note from the Session of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the [Polish United Workers’ Party] Central Committee

The note discribes situations with the Soviet Union, including the recent Soviet party split, possible aggression with China, and the trade of meat and grain between Poland and the Soviet Union.

November 20, 1964

Stenographic Protocol of the II Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (excerpts)

Gomulka addresses the justification for Khrushchev's removal and describes some of the recent foreign policy problems experienced as a result of Khrushchev's actions.

January 17, 1950

Conversation, V.M. Molotov and A.Y Vyshinsky with Mao Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950

In this conversation Molotov reads out to Mao the part of Acheson's Jan. 12 statement about the Soviet take-over of Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang. Molotov proposes that the Chinese Foreign Ministry issues a refutation. Mao suggests that Xinhua should do that, but Molotov disagrees, and Mao promises that the Foreign Ministry will issue a statement. Mao, for his part, mentions several US probes to establish relations with Communist China, but notes that his policy is to keep the Americans at arms' length, and, in fact, to force them to leave China altogether. Towards the end Molotov and Mao discuss China's representation at the UN (Molotov asks that China appoint a representative, something that Mao appears reluctant to do), and China's representation at the Allied Control Council for Japan.

Pagination