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Documents

September 11, 1987

North Korea’s Advance Notice for Delivery of a Letter to the National Olympic Committee of the ROK on the Olympic games

An advance notice from North Korea that a letter on issues regarding the 1988 Summer Olympics will be delivered. Issues of co-hosting and other negotiations are covered.

October 8, 1985

Ichiro Ogimura and Young C. Kim's Efforts to Facilitate the 1988 Olympic Games

Letters from Ichiro Ogimura to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch and DPRK NOC President Kum Yu Sun on Ogimura and Young C. Kim's efforts to facilitate the 1988 Olympic Games.

January 11, 1988

Letter from the DPRK’s National Olympic Committee to the International Olympic Committee President stating North Korea’s Position regarding their Participation in the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

A letter from North Korean Olympic Committee President Kim Yu Sun to IOC President Samaranch indicating that North Korea was not likely to participate in the upcoming 1988 Summer Olympics. North Korea cited the failure to come up with a joint hosting plan as the main issue, but pointed out that they remained hopeful that an agreement might be reached.

January 15, 1986

Letter from the International Olympic Committee President to the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the ROK with a Summary of the January 8-9 1986 Meeting between the Two Korean NOCS

A letter from IOC President Samaranch to the North Korean Olympic Committee, which included a summary of a recent meeting between the Olympic Committees of North and South Korea, at which some of the issues discussed were events that could be held in North Korea, the torch relay, and future meetings.

January 15, 1988

Information Note on a Visit by Soviet Olympic Committee President Gramow to Munich

Report submitted to IOC President Samaranch describing a visit to by Soviet Olympic Committee President Gramow to Munich. Gramow remarked that North Korea's decision on participating the upcoming 1988 Summer Olympics would have no influence on the attitude of the Soviet Union. Gramow also commented that sporting relations between the USSR and Germany were developing positively.

January 18, 1988

Note from Juan Antonio Samaranch to Mr. Willi Daume

Note from IOC President Samaranch to Germany Olympic Committee President Willi Daume, thanking him for a report.

June 8, 1961

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth reports on party membership and purges in the Korean Workers' Party based on a speech delivered by Kim Il Sung.

July 14, 1972

Record of discussion and text of coordination plan on operative technology from the summer of 1972 through 1974, reached by the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior

The KGB and head representative of operative technical services for the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior agreed to a plan to continue the exchange of scientific-technical information and samples of operative technology and to convene meetings of specialists on these topics. The text of the coordination plan of summer 1972 - 1974 follows, and categories governed by it include technical documents, photographs, criminology, confidential documents, radio electronics and photo optics.

April 5, 1962

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Report from Hungarian Ambassador József Kovács on criticism of Soviet revisionism from within the Korean Workers' Party and the increase of institutional paranoia in North Korea, especially of foreigners and foreign-born Koreans.

December 11, 1975

Cooperative plan between the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet KGB from the summer of 1976 to 1980

This cooperation agreement seeks to use Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation as a means to achieve the following objectives: (1) subverting attempts by hostile factions to infiltrate both countries' national and joint staff and military bodies having access to classified military information; (2) detection and obstruction of attempts by state enemies to carry out subversive acts against national and joint armed forces; (3) perfection of counter-intelligence security actions by the Warsaw Treaty united command; and (4) prevention and timely detection of possible leaks of classified information.

Pagination