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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Sino-Soviet Relations

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Photograph of 38th parallel crossing during Korean War

Korean War, 1950-1953

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Puzanov, A. M.

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Journalist informer

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Documents

September 30, 1950	Memorandum from Gromyko to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft cable from Gromyko to Shtykov A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.
October 1, 1950	Ciphered Telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (via Roshchin) Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai asking that they consider moving 5-6 divisions of Chinese volunteers to the China-DPRK border in order to give the North Koreans cover under which to reorganize their troops. Stalin explicitly states that he will not mention this idea to the North Koreans.
October 3, 1950	Ciphered Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin] Telegram from Mao to Stalin on whether or not to move several divisions of Chinese volunteers into North Korea.
January 29, 1968	Memorandum of a Conversation with the Ambassadors of the CSSR, Comrade Holub, and of the People’s Republic of Poland, Comrade Naperei Upon reviewing the Pueblo incident, both ambassadors conclude that the U.S. violated the Armistice Treaty. Instead of using force to retain their ship and men, the U.S. should issue an apology to the DPRK or else the Koreans will fight back.
October 13, 1950	Memorandum, Golovko and Fokin to Stalin Report of U.S. naval activity in the vicinity of Cheongjin.
February 1, 1968	Informational Report by Ambassador Herrmann As North Koreans prepared for a new war after the Pueblo Incident, East German Ambassador Herrmann explains that the USSR and PRC will fight with nuclear weapons on the DPRK's side.
June 20, 1967	Telegram from Valeriu Georgescu, Extrordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister of Romania in Tel Aviv, Regarding the Position of the Israeli Communist Party vis-a-vis the [Israeli] conflict with Arab Nations S. Mikunis, Secretary General of the Israeli Communist Party, thanks the Romanian envoy for Romania's support during the recent Arab-Israeli War. He compares this to the Soviet position, which he characterizes as aggressively anti-Israel and anti-socialist. He accuses the USSR of instigating Egypt's attack. He also denies the existence of any atrocities against civilians by the Israeli army in the occupied territories.
June 2007	Agent Reports. Procedural guidance on the form of agent reports in criminal cases. Folder 10. The Chekist Anthology. This document outlines the limits and requirements of an agent’s engagement in the implementation of given objectives. The limits of an agent’s participation in a criminal investigation are set by an operative responsible for a particular case. Taking into account concrete circumstances of each assignment, the operative determines proper format of an agent report in order to fully detail all relevant information. The primary requirement of agent reports is to capture the circumstances, connections, and function of persons and events under investigation. Agent reports must be comprehensive, complete and objective. In criminal cases, every agent must conduct a deep examination of one’s lifestyle, behavior, habits, psychological condition, peer pressure, facial expressions and intonation. Agent reports are attached to an agent’s Working and Personal files. When an agent is relocated to a different KGB center, the reports included in the Working file remain in the original center for 10 years, while his or her Personal file is sent to a new location, where a new Working file is created.
June 24, 1967	Record of Conversation between Polish Politburo member Zenon Kliszko and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow Brevhnev describes discussions he's had with North Vietnamese leaders, who only want the U.S. bombings to end in order to open negotiations. He also discusses the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war at the UN General Assembly; even though the assembly condemned Israel, the Arabs are shaken by defeat. The only hope for the Arabs is the support of the USSR. He has also warned Fidel Castro not to push things too far.
July 11, 1967	Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Budapest (excerpts) Soviet-bloc leaders discuss fallout of the Six Day War on the Arab countries. The focus particularly on the critical need to support the "progressive" Nasser regime. There is some debate over whether more military aid to the Arabs is necessary or wasteful. The leaders make it clear that they support the existence of the State of Israel and want to avoid getting dragged into a wider Middle East War. The idea of UAR recognition of Israel in exchange for the right of return is floated. Kosygin also gives a summary of his meeting with Johnson in New York.