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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Emir Farid Chehab

Emir Farid Chehab Collection

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Sino-Soviet Relations

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

Photograph of 38th parallel crossing during Korean War

Korean War, 1950-1953

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Puzanov, A. M.

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Journalist informer

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Documents

June 2007	The USSR-France Society. Folder 71. The Chekist Anthology This note describes the relations between the U.S.S.R. – France Society and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD). According to Mitrokhin, SSOD was founded in 1958 as a public organization for intellectuals interested in Soviet studies. However, the U.S.S.R. – France Society served as a cover institution for KGB agents. Although the multi-national organization was a threat to leaks of confidential information, undercover agents used the relations between the two organizations to establish connections with diplomats, the heads of influential clubs, journalists, and scientists. It was convenient for KGB agents to organize events to promote political goals. Because of the relations developed as a result of these activities, the KGB residency prevented a number of anti-socialist decisions.
June 2007	Stiffening control over citizens. Folder 56. The Chekist Anthology This report provides evidence of a secret Moldovan KGB and Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) conference which took place in July 2, 1976. In this folder Mitrokhin provides a detailed plan for cooperation between these two institutions in order to provide state and public security. According to Mitrokhin, state security had been threatened by foreign spies, anti-socialist leadership, foreign tourists from capitalist countries, Jewish and German extremists, and sectarians. In order to counter these perceived threats, the officials of both institutions agreed to provide each other with the needed information, to organize events to promote socialism and patriotism, and to cooperate under any circumstances. This folder provides evidence that the officials were most concerned about foreign visitors and their activities in Moldova. A number of actions were taken to prohibit any kind of a threat, including special control over temporary residents, prohibiting immigration of people of Jewish and German descent, confiscating weapons from civilian foreigners, and detaining them in case they violate law and order. Mitrokhin points out that the officials agreed that strengthening the State Automobile Inspectorate (GAI) and border patrol would be necessary to avoid the chance of the smallest opposition movement.
June 2007	Neutralizing of Dissidents’ Activities in the 1970s. Folder 49. The Chekist Anthology In this entry Mitrokhin describes dissidents’ activities in the Soviet Union and KGB attempts to stop them.
June 2007	Operational Techniques. Folder 76. The Chekist Anthology In this folder Mitrokhin reports on some spy techniques used by the KGB in major western European cities (including Helsinki, Geneva, Bucharest) in 1975. According to Mitrokhin, the main tasks for KGB residents trained in the use of operational techniques were to check post offices for foreign correspondence, to secretly receive information about meetings of officials of a certain country, and to videotape any acts of anti-socialist movements. This note provides detailed statistics on the photographs taken of foreign mail, telephone recordings, and radio-intercepts. Mitrokhin specifically focuses on operations which took place in Vienna. As his note states, KGB agents photographed thousands of pages of secret materials using the “Zagadka,” a mini-camera built into a regular pen. The KGB residency had their own “TS” correspondence service with 98 N-line—undercover agents operated by legal residents—around Europe. Residents used microdot script and steganography —the art of writing hidden messages—for agents of N-line. As Mitrokhin states, X-line—residency subunit of scientific-technical investigation—agents’ tasks were to provide materials for secret operations. They built in a recording device in an ashtray, used the inside of an automobile seats to keep secret materials, and batteries for cameras. Mitrokhin also provides the exact number and names of all KGB residency agencies in Vienna in 1975, and describes security techniques used for their technology and agents.
March 13, 1989	Minutes of Conversation of the Meeting of the Executive Political Committee (BCEx) of the RCP CC Ceausescu informs the Committee about a foreign spy, Raceanu, that had been uncovered and also discusses activities of former party members, "political hooligans."
December 17, 1947	Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov] Terebin (Andrei Orlov) returns Kuznetsov's (Stalin) cable concerning a visit to Moscow by Mao. Terebin gives Mao's response to the invitation and tells of a discussion that took place between himself and Mao after Stalin's message was relayed.
April 20, 1948	Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin] Stalin responds to two letters from Mao, via Terebin (Andrei Orlov). In the cable, Stalin gives advice to Mao on what to do with opposing parties once the Chinese revolution is complete and whether or not Mao should include the liberal bourgeosie in China's central government.
October 14, 1950	Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Feng Xi (Stalin) Shtykov describes the reactions of Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong to Stalin's telegram to postpone the evacuation of the troops to the north. (see also)
October 13, 1950	Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin) Message to Stalin from Roshchin relaying the rationale for Mao's reversal of his earlier hesitance to send Chinese troops to the aid of the North Koreans. General plans for the deployment are stated as well as a request for arms on credit from the Soviet Union.
October 13, 1950	Ciphered Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov) A telegram from Stalin to Shtykov for Kim Il Sung relaying the decision of the Chinese to support North Korea with their troops. This decision is a marked reversal of the negative message sent 3 October by Mao.