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Documents

May 20, 1965

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Swedish Military Chief Seeks Appropriation for Nuclear Weapons in Next Budget'

In a move interpreted by INR as part of a pro-nuclear “propaganda campaign,” Swedish Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp reportedly asked for funds for to cover the costs of nuclear weapons acquisition.

December 30, 1964

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Interest in a West German Commitment Not To Manufacture Nuclear Weapons'

INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to “play upon French concern” that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF.

June 5, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

April 4, 1963

Research Memorandum RSB-47 from Thomas Hughes to the Secretary, 'Signs of Kremlin Decision to Improve Its Strategic Posture'

INR analysts pointed to events during mid-February 1963 which suggested that the Soviet leadership was taking steps to spend a greater share of the gross national product on military resources.

February 21, 1962

Research Memorandum RSB-58 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Probable Soviet Reaction to Establishment of Multilateral NATO-Controlled MRBM Force'

As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

September 15, 1973

Note on Military Coup in Chile by S.K. Arora, Deputy Secretary, Americas

Speculates about the CIA's potential role in the coup in Chile.

March 29, 1982

Minutes of the Meeting between Wang Sheng (Director of the General Political Warfare Department, Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan) and Lieutenant General Dato Shazali Che Mat (Head of Department of Military Intelligence, Ministry of Defense)

General Wang and Malaysia's General Dato Shazali Che Mat discuss anti-communism and Taiwan-Malaysia military relations.

September 8, 1982

Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 91-2-82, 'Argentina's Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falklands Defeat'

The document reports that Argentina did not have a military component in its nuclear program and evaluates Argentina’s capacity of developing a nuclear program with military purposes.

September 1944

Memorandum by George Kennan , 'Russia – Seven Years Later' (excerpt)

George Kennan describes Stalin's character, underlining the importance of his nationality, ignorance of the west, and his seclusion. Kennan further warns that Stalin's advisors are not interested in collaborating with western democracies, and that Russia's internal police regime is developed beyond its foreign policy.

Pagination