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Documents

July 19, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-third Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the 23rd restricted session on Indochina. The delegates of the conference hope to make an agreement on the 20th. Zhou notes that both the Chinese/Russian side and the other side have begun to make compromises, however Bao Dai's Vietnamese delegation refused to the division of Vietnam.

June 29, 1954

Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the Central Committee, 'Briefing on the Meeting by the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations'

Li Kenong reports on his usual meeting between the Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations. Kuznetsov says the French think the Vietnamese are too demanding. Also, the Vietnamese request more discussion on economic issues and less of zone division.

August 6, 1964

Report on the meeting between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s ambassador Nguyen Ngoc-Son with Qemal Rahmanaj

This document is a report on a meeting between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's representative, Nguyen Ngoc-Son, with an Albanian official, Qemal Rahmanaj. Nguyen-Ngoc-Son reveals the American and South Vietnamese 1955 plan concerning marching into North Vietnam and establishing order in the South. In 1961 the plan is carried out in 3 phases. In phase 1, the Americans and the South Vietnamese government cooperated to create order in South Vietnam and establish American bases in North Vietnam. Phase 2 includes improving the military capability of the U.S. army and commencing sabotage operations in the North. Phase 3 includes developing the South Vietnamese economy and the beginning of military operations against North Vietnam. Alarmingly, the frequency of attacks against North Vietnam increases even further in 1964. Because of this, the ambassador asks for a press conference to inform Albanian media about the situation in Vietnam.

March 6, 1954

Cable from Zhang Wentian, 'Reporting the Preliminary Opinions of Our Side on the Geneva Conference to the Soviet Side'

Zhang Wentian discusses his visit with Molotov. During this meeting, Molotov says delegations from China, Korea, and Vietnam are welcome to Moscow before the Geneva conference to discuss its proceedings. Molotov also mentions several issues that still need to be discussed, such as relaxing tensions in Asia, Korean unification, ministers in attendance at the conference, and India's participation in the Indochina discussion.

June 26, 1954

Cable from Li Kenong, 'Concerning the Content of a Meeting between the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese Delegations'

The Chinese, Vietnamese, and Soviet delegations meet to discuss the division of zones in Indochina.

May 2, 1962

Report on Reiz Malile’s Ambassadorial Credentials Sent to the DRV and his Discussions with the DRV Leaders

The new ambassador to China and to the DRV, Reiz Malile, reports on his meetings with Vietnamese leaders during his visit to Vietnam on 14 – 28 of April 1962. Malile states that he met DRV President Ho Chi Minh, the Prime Minister of the DRV, Fam Van Dong, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the DRV, Ung Van Khiem, and 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Working Party of Vietnam, Le Duan. In his discussions, they support the Albanian government's stance on Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership in general. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese leaders avoid discussions targeted against the Soviet Union and, instead, propose the need for unity in the international communist movement. They also ask to stop the polemic in the media in order for the other bloc not to profit from the internal disputes of the communist camp. According to Malile, among the Vietnamese leadership there is a strong spirit not to cause a break with the Soviet Union. Malile claims that the Vietnamese communists are not fully informed on Albanian-Soviet disputes, which they view as simple disagreements between brothers. According to Malile, there is a great deal of Chinese and Soviet propaganda concerning the political international situation that presents differing points of view.

June 20, 1954

Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Wei Guoqing, Qiao Xiaoguang and Convey to the Vietnamese Workers Party Central Committee, Regarding the Meeting between the Premier and Comrade Ding

The CCP informs Wei Guoqing et al that while Molotov, Eden, and Smith are absent, the conference will discuss military issues regarding Indochina. Zhou has met with Molotov about this, and wants to meet with several Chinese and Vietnamese officials.

December 2, 1961

Telegram from Behar Shtylla to Ung Van Khiem

This document is a telegram from Albanian Foreign Affairs Minister Behar Shtylla to the Foreign Affairs Minister of North Vietnam, Ung Van Khiem. Shtylla shares the same indignation as the Vietnamese minister towards the dangerous situation arising in Vietnam. According to Shtylla, Kennedy is trying to transform South Vietnam into a base of operations for aggression directed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Taking into account other actions towards Laos and Cambodia, he believes Kennedy is attempting to convert Indochina into an American base. Shtylla states that the American policy in Vietnam violates the general international conventions of conduct, as well as the Vietnamese people’s sovereignty. Shtylla expresses full solidarity with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and supports its request that the chairmen of the Geneva Conference take measures against the American inference in South Vietnam.

August 10, 1964

Meeting between the North Vietnamese ambassador with the 1st vice-minister of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of Albania Vasil Nathanaili

This document outlines the meeting between the North Vietnamese ambassador with the 1st vice-minister of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of Albania, Vasil Nathanaili. The ambassador thanks the Albanian government for the August 7 declaration in support of North Vietnamese sovereignty and independence. He informs the Albanian official about the growing pressure of the American government on the United Nations to become more involved in the conflict in Vietnam and to spread the blame for violating the Geneva Convention of 1954 on Indochina to North Vietnam. It is stated that the Soviet representative in the UN proposed to invite a North Vietnamese delegation to discuss the situation in Vietnam without previously informing the North Vietnamese government about the issue, prompting an official complaint to the Soviet embassy in Hanoi. Furthermore, the American representatives in the UN invited a South Vietnamese delegation in order to discuss the same issue. The document also mentions the reaction of the North Vietnamese government after the supposed violation of the Geneva Convention and specific steps to condemn the Americans publicly.

November 20, 1984

Information on Changes in the Strategic and Tactical Struggle of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL)

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.

Pagination