Skip to content

Results:

181 - 190 of 363

Documents

October 8, 1964

Report, Canadian Defence Research Board, 'Possible Israeli Military Nuclear Program'

After analyzing photographs taken of the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona, J. Koop, a career intelligence analyst at Canada's Defence Research Board, concluded in March 1964 that Dimona had all of the "prerequisites for commencing a modest nuclear weapons development project." When the Dimona reactor went critical, it could produce enough plutonium for at least one implosion device by the end of 1965 and increase its operating level to produce one to two per year by 1966. Arthur Kellas, a British diplomat in Israel, wrote in his forwarding letter that they were highly impressed by the analysis.

September 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Argentina: Seeking Nuclear Independence: An Intelligence Assessment'

According to the 1985 report, the Argentines “have achieved at least a proof of principle of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion.” In other words, they had a workable system. Nevertheless, the enrichment plant would not be “fully operational until 1987-1988.” While the assessment of Argentine interest in nuclear weapons did not change, CIA analysts asserted that “Argentina continues to develop the necessary facilities and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons development effort.”

January 10, 1994

Interview with Myer 'Mike' Feldman by Avner Cohen

Transcript of interview by Avner Cohen with senior Kennedy advisor Myer "Mike" Feldman. Myer Feldman, close aide to JFK and special liason to Israel, discusses the negotiations between the US and Israel regarding the Non-Proliferation treaty in this 1994 interview.

January 20, 1994

Phone Interview with Edwin Kintner by Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller

Transcript of a phone interview with Edwin Kintner by Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller. Edwin Kintner (1920-2010) was a distinguished nuclear engineer and senior staff member of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) through the 1960s and 70s who participated in at least two US inspection teams sent to the Dimona nuclear facility. Kintner recounts how thoroughly he and his partners searched the Dimona site for evidence of plutonium reprocessing activities and expresses shock upon learning that he and his team had been fooled all along.

November 28, 1989

Decision About the Measures Regarding the Decision of the KGB Collegium of the USSR of 5 September 1989, 'About the Tasks of the State Security Services of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime'

In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.

July 24, 1989

Decision of the Moldavian KGB Collegium, On the Implementation Status by KGB MSSR Section 5 'Fulfillment of the Directives of the XXVIIth CPSU Congress
on the Intensification of Ideological-Educational Work'

Report by the Moldavian KGB on the decisions it had implemented of the USSR KGB Collegium from the previous year. Includes work to counter Romanian nationalist propaganda. Romania is referred to by the code name "Objective 24." General-Lieutenant G.M. Volkov, the Chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB, maintained that an all-out offensive was required, including the use of “persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art,” in order to neutralize “the subversive activity of the adversary” by identifying and isolating the “emissaries of the adversary” and imposing “permanent and reliable operational control” over them.

June 19, 1953

National Security Council Report, NSC 158, 'United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States'

Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

June 14, 1948

Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Effects of Soviet Restrictions on the US Position in Berlin"

Describes effect of Soviet restrictive measures in Berlin on US intelligence and propaganda activities and on operations of the joint military government.

February 22, 1946

George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'

George F. Kennan writes to the Secretary of State with a lengthy analysis of Soviet policy in an attempt to explain their recent uncooperative behavior. This message would later become famous as the "long telegram."

June 1941

Report from the People’s Committee of Internal Affairs to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party, about Agent 'Volodya' (Imre Nagy)

Sverdlov provides a brief overview of agent "Volodya" (Imre Nagy) and his work.

Pagination