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July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

March 20, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-16 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Swedish Decision to Cut Military Spending Causes Defense Review, Reduces Likelihood of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition'

The Swedish government rejected Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp’s proposals to fund a nuclear weapons program. This INR report from March 1967 on proposed cuts in defense spending suggested that the possibility that Sweden would acquire nuclear weapons had grown even more remote.

July 28, 1966

Research Memorandum REU-52 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Weapons Question Continues to Plague Swedish Government'

In 1966, Sweden's Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Torsten Rapp, sought funds to support planning to produce nuclear weapons.

May 20, 1965

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Swedish Military Chief Seeks Appropriation for Nuclear Weapons in Next Budget'

In a move interpreted by INR as part of a pro-nuclear “propaganda campaign,” Swedish Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp reportedly asked for funds for to cover the costs of nuclear weapons acquisition.

April 23, 1965

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Will Communist China Assist Other Nations in Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?'

Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.

December 30, 1964

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Soviet Interest in a West German Commitment Not To Manufacture Nuclear Weapons'

INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to “play upon French concern” that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF.

May 14, 1964

Research Memorandum INR-16 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Indian Nuclear Weapons Development'

An intelligence report that the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay was being changed every six months raised questions about India’s nuclear objectives: a six-month period was quite short for “normal research reactor operations,” but it was the optimum time for using the CIR’s spent fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium. According to INR, India had taken the “first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon,” which was to have “available, on demand, unsafeguarded weapons-grade plutonium or, at the least, the capacity to produce it.”

August 28, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-56 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Sweden Still Faces Question of Acquiring Nuclear Weapons'

Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force

June 5, 1963

Research Memorandum REU-44 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Evidence of Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction in European NATO Countries with the Lack of a Share in Ownership or Control of Nuclear Weapons'

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

May 22, 1963

Research Memorandum RFE-40 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Acting Secretary, 'A French Nuclear Testing Site in the Pacific? – Plans and Repercussions'

France’s staging of atmospheric and underground tests in Algeria became increasingly untenable when neighboring African countries protested and even temporarily broke diplomatic relations with Paris. Once Algeria became independent in 1962, French authorities made plans to develop a test site in Polynesia.

Pagination