The record and attached resolution concerns the final decision by the Politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to send arms and "special technology" to Cuba. Among the arms shipped are 2 mobile artillery batteries, 50 million 7.92 mm bullets, and military specialists to aid the Cuban military in the construction of anti-aircraft defenses on Cuban territory. This would prove to be fruitful for the Cubans in the coming Bay of Pigs Invasion.

The report concerns requests from Cuba for shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia, along with providing advisors to the Cuban military. Among the arms being transferred are Czechoslovak fighter planes, automatic rifles and ammunition, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. Clearly the Cuban desires for arms were fueled by fears of American attack, which would come to fruition in the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion.

These concern preparations by the Czechoslovak government for the visit of Ernesto "Che" Guevara on 23 October 1960. The primary topics of discussion are economic assistance to Cuba and advice on raw material production, as Cuba was in the process of nationalizing its economy.

The report details a meeting between Deputy Foreign Minister Hajek with Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa. After a dinner banquet which is attended by all members of the Cuban foreign ministry and the Czechoslovak embassy, Hajek and Roa pay a visit to Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Chairman of the Cuban National Bank. Conversations ranged from Cuba's international status to ways of thwarting American aggression. It is noted that Guevara was highly paranoid of an American attack on Cuba.

This includes further orders of weapons shipment to the Cuban revolutionary government under the guise of "special materials." Also included is a short profile on Raul Castro, member of the Cuban delegation, as well as the details of his stay in Czechoslovakia.

Czech government decision in late September 1959, to approve sending what was euphemistically described as “special technical supplies” or “special technology” (but in truth were weapons, specifically 50,000 submachine guns and ammunition) to Havana, using a neutral Swiss firm as a cut-out to conceal the transaction, especially from American eyes.

This presents evidence of Czechoslovak-Cuban relations forming in 1959, which includes the somewhat sensitive issue of Prague’s attempting to grasp the relationship and balance of power within Havana’s rulers between Fidel Castro’s “July 26th” movement and the traditional, pro-Moscow communist party, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP).

The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.

Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.