Translated memorandum discusses how Ministry of Defense documents concerning martial law were translated and presented to Brezhnev. The document later explains the parameters set up by Brezhnev and Polish officials under which martial must be set up and executed.

Translated document discusses possible military and Soviet intervention to deal with political unrest in the wake of implementing martial law.

Translation discusses the preparation for martial law through appointing Defense Council and committee members, martial law paperwork, increasing the defense budge from Soviet loans, and expanding military exports.

Sources reveal the Soviet-supported Polish government intends to declare a state of Martial Law.

Assesses the validity of Gen. Leon Dubicki's allegations Soviet troops are wearing Polish uniforms in the implementation of martial law.

General Wyderkowski reports on topics such as: problems within the Soviet Union specifically with economic and industry production; military industry development observations, including nuclear preparations; suggestion for more interaction between army and society; efforts for positive relationship between Polish Embassy and Moscow and little contact with capitalist countries; 22nd Congress of the Soviet Union; new military training techniques; and foreign policy, especially increased interest in diplomatic ties to Africa.

Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

General Pavlovsky writes to the Commander of the Polish Second Army, Brigadier General Florian Siwicki. He lists preliminary steps in Operation Danube where the troops enter from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”