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September 28, 1942	Decree No. 2352 cc of Ukrainian State Committee of Defence This famous, de-classified document officially started the Soviet atomic project aimed at producing the nuclear bomb. The second point of this document orders the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences to establish a plan for the project of Uranium enrichment. F. Lange, a scientist from the Ukraine Institute of Physics and Technology, was appointed as head of this project because he worked previously on theoretical aspects of Uranium enrichment.
October 1940	Technical Proposal of F. Lange, V. Maslov, and V. Shpinel, 'Fission of Uranium Isotopes by Using Method of Coriolis Acceleration' Kharkov Institute scientists proposed in this document the concrete steps to build a nuclear weapon. The document demonstrates that Ukrainian physicists understood how to receive weapons grade uranium and elaborated concrete technical proposals to achieve this goal through uranium enrichment in centrifuge.
January 10, 1978	National Intelligence Daily Cable, NIDC 78/007C, 'Argentina: No Treaty Ratification' This CIA bulletin notes the failure of U.S.-Argentine nuclear negotiations after Cyrus Vance’s visit to Argentina in December 1977. The U.S. proposed to supply highly enriched uranium for Argentina’s reactor exported to Peru, as well as to approve of a heavy water plant from Canada and asked in exchange for the Argentine ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty as well as the deferral of their spent-fuel reprocessing plans.
July 30, 1987	Embassy Islamabad telegram 16052 to Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case—July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy' Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.
July 30, 1987	Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16052 to the Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case - July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy' Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.
August 3, 1987	Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16389 to Department of State, 'Armacost-Sattar Roundtable: Nuclear Issues' Armacost reported to Secretary Shultz, “I emphasized the need for immediate practical steps to demonstrate to an aroused Congress and a skeptical administration that no further illegal procurement activities would take place and that we had verifiable assurances there would be no further enrichment of weapons-grade uranium.”
July 23, 1987	US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman for the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 'The Pakistani Procurement Cases' With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.
May 29, 1986	Embassy Islamabad Cable 11791 to Department of State, 'Nuclear: Solarz Conversation with GOP' The year after Congress passed the Solarz amendment in August 1985, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-CA) traveled to Pakistan, a country that would become a major test case for the amendment which cut off U.S. foreign aid to recipients. Solarz confronted General Zia and other top officials with his perception, based on U.S. intelligence, that Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was enriching weapons-grade enriched uranium. The Pakistanis strenuously denied the charge.
November 22, 1985	Embassy Bonn Telegram 35237 to Department of State, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment to Pakistan' In response to the State Department's request, the Foreign Office found that the equipment had not been delivered and German firms had been informed that an export license needed to be granted.
September 19, 1985	Department of State Telegram 287763 to Embassy Bonn, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment equipment to Pakistan' As these telegrams demonstrate, by the fall of 1986, if not earlier, the U.S. government believed that a Pakistani firm, Multinational Inc., was a “procurement agent” for A.Q. Khan’s secret network. In this case, Pakistani agents operating in West Germany were trying to secure aluminum tubes that could be used for the Khan Laboratory’s gas centrifuge program.