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Documents

September 14, 1961

Reception by N.S. Khrushchev of Japanese Ambassador H. Yamada, September 14, 1961

The two parties discuss solutions for improving Soviet-Japanese trade relations. Khrushchev expresses concern about Japan's military ties with the US, given that there are US army bases in Japan. Yamada raises the concern of logistical difficulties faced by Japanese businesspeople visiting the USSR. The two parties also discuss Soviet-Japanese treaties and geopolitical relations. 

August 29, 1960

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Prominent Political Figure of Japan M. Suzuki on August 29, 1960

Khrushchev and Suzuki discuss Japan's neutrality, the American intelligence plane incident, and the failure of the Paris summit. 

May 10, 1960

Record of Conversation: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev with the Minister of Farming and Forestry of Japan T. Fukuda and Chairman of the Association of Fisheries T. Takasaki May 10, 1960

The leaders discuss possibilities to improve the Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese delegation inquires about the permission for Japanese fishermen to use the Soviet fishing grounds and a chance to establish aerial communication between Japan and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev affirms the Soviet-Japanese friendship and expresses willingness to conduct trade. 

January 25, 1960

N.S. Khrushchev’s Note on a Memorandum to Japan

Khrushchev offers further corrections for a memorandum to Japan. 

January 24, 1960

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s Note on a Memorandum to Japan

Khrushchev suggests to not frame America as an aggressor and offers to focus on the issue of Japanese national independence. He announces that Japan can only return to the Japanese with the departure of foreign troops

August 5, 1957

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Vice President of the “Japan-USSR” Friendship Society Kazami Akira

Kazami and Khrushchev discuss the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Japanese independence. Kazami inquires about the possible participation of Japanese specialist in the industrial development of Siberia. He also asks about the potential transfer of the Kuril Islands to Japan. 

November 30, 1967

Guidelines for the Czechoslovak Delegation attending the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1967

The final instructions for the Czechoslovak delegation en route to Geneva for the ENDC in November 1967.  The treaty was mostly finished by this time; only the final details remained. Denunciation of US foreign policy and prevention of West Germany’s nuclear weapon acquisition reappear in these instructions.

August 2, 1963

Antonín Gregor, 'Explanatory Memorandum [on the Limited Test Ban Treaty]'

A report produced by the Czechoslovak foreign ministry in August 1963 recommending the ratification of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  One of the key goals of early Czechoslovak engagement in the ENDC was to reject a nuclear test ban, based on their rejection of any verification measures. However, once the Soviets agreed to the LTBT with the US and the United Kingdom, the Czechoslovak foreign ministry praised the agreement and attacked those (such as China) who resisted the measure. One interesting aspect of the treaty was the proposed role of depositary powers. The document indicates that the Soviets were interested in being a depositary power to the LTBT in order to prevent ratification by governments not recognized by the USSR, most notably West Germany and the Republic of China. The issue of depositary powers reappeared later on, in the NPT as well.

May 1963

Undated, untitled memorandum on Soviet-US Negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

March 6, 1962

Resolution of the 186th Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1962, 'Preparation of Czechoslovak Delegation and Proposal to be Sent to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament'

A record of the conclusions of the 186th meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met on March 6, 1962.  The attachment includes the initial instructions for the Czechoslovak delegations to the first meeting of ENDC. The document testifies to the strong preoccupation with West Germany’s re-armament, and the possibility of West Germany nuclear-weapon acquisition. Czechoslovakia travelled to Geneva with a goal of avoiding this outcome at any cost. Although the document offers a broad overview of the “lay of the land” ahead of the first meeting of ENDC, it is the focus on West Germany that is the most obvious here

Pagination