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Documents

June 18, 1953

Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov to N.A. Bulganin, 2:30 p.m.

The authors state that Berlin was calm, but there were a few demonstrations in some smaller GDR cities. The authors referred to military intelligence information according to which the US 7th Army and the 12th Air Force Army were put on alert in the US zone at 5.30 a.m. on June 18. But the alert state for the 7th Army was canceled after three hours.

October 30, 1956

Report from Politburo members Mikoyan and Suslov on the crisis in Hungary

Mikoyan-Suslov Report on the deterioration of the political situation in Hungary. the report states that popular forces are taking over the radio station and the post office and that the Imre Nagy government does not want to use force against the uprising. Fearful of a strong reaction from the UN Security Council, Mikoyan and Suslov suggest that the Soviet leadership stop the inlux of Red Army units in Hungary for the time being.

February 20, 1979

Saddam and High-Ranking Officials Discussing Khomeini, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, the Potential for Kurdish Unrest, and the Iranian Economy

Transcript of a meeting between Saddam and some Iraqi diplomatic personnel dated 20 February 1979. The meeting's main issue was Iran and Khomeini. One of the attendants asked Saddam if there is any possibility of turbulence in Iranian Kurdistan due to the internal chaos of the Iranian government. And if so, how would it affect Iraqi Kurdistan. They talked about the Iranian economy and the Iranian army. They said that the Iranian air force contains mostly American jets and it was built on American experience. Secondly they had a discussion about Eritrea and the diplomatic relationship between Iraq and Eritrea.

June 2007

About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.

July 8, 1953

Memorandum of Informal Psychological Strategy Board Meeting

The logistics behind a food relief distribution plan for East Germany are discussed.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry

Alekseev transmits that Cuba’s army has mobilized and the subsequent affect on Cuba’s economy because of Kennedy’s recent speech. Cuba waits for the Soviet Union’s opinion on the recent events.

June 25, 1953

Summary of Discussion at the 151st Meeting of the National Security Council

American response to East German protests, plans of action toward the Soviet Union, question of defectors from socialist countries, implementation of passive and active resistance in socialist countries.

March 1975

Task for the Operational Command Staff Exercise Soyuz-75 for the 4th Army

This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."

July 6, 1988

Information Note from Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck to International Olympic Committee President on the Issue of Security and Terrorist Threats to the 1988 Seoul Olympics

Letters exchanged between the President of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, and Dr. Klaus Georg Wieck on the security situation in South Korea in the lead up to the 1988 Olympics. Wieck's enclosed security report provides details on the South Korean opposition, security preparations completed by the South Korean government, and the potential for terrorist threats or activities during the Olympic Games.

July 11, 1983

Information from the Bulgarian Communist Party Regarding the Visit of the Delegation of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to Bulgaria

Information summarizing the objectives of a visit of the FSLN delegation, headed by Baiardo Arse [name is spelled phonetically], to Bulgaria. The visit, which took place from 28 June to July 3 1983, aimed at exchanging information and ideas on ways to reform FSLN, in order to transform the Front into an avant-garde Marxist-Leninist party.
The document describes the political and economic pressure exerted by the Reagan administration on a number of Central and Latin American countries, in order to decrease the support for the Front and other leftist revolutionary movements. According to the information FSLN responded to these measures by consolidating and strengthening its army, and national militia; maintaining transparency and political pluralism; strengthening the cooperative and state economic sector, and redirecting trade to new markets, mainly in the socialist community.

Pagination