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Documents

June 2007

About an Embassy. Folder 78. The Chekist Anthology

Folder 78 concerns KGB operations against the Syrian embassy in Moscow in the early 1970’s. It begins with brief biographical descriptions of the KGB agents and confidential contacts involved in penetrating the embassy. The Syrian Ambassador, Vhaya Jamil, was targeted by female KGB agents and confidential contacts who were told to express a romantic interest in him, while an official from the embassy’s military procurement bureau was targeted by a KGB agent who enticed the official into engaging in foreign currency speculation. As a result of his actions, the official was expelled from the Soviet Union.

The KGB also used specially organized hunting trips on which agents and confidential contacts developed relations with Ambassador Vhaya. During one such hunting trip the Ambassador revealed the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai V. Podgorny would visit Egypt in January 1971 to sign a friendship agreement with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. On a similar occasion on 12 September, 1973, Ambassador Vhaya explained that the short term goal of Middle Eastern leaders was to debunk the myth of Israeli invincibility, while the long term goal of destroying Israel, would have to wait for 5-15 years.

Finally, Ambassador Vhaya became one of the KGB’s confidential contacts on a KGB organized hunting trip codenamed OPERATION T, which was personally approved by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. During the trip, a KGB agent was assigned to invite Vhaya to what was purported to be his aunt’s dacha. Subsequently the Ambassador was considered to be a KGB confidential contact.

August 15, 1956

Ministry for State Security, Main Department II, ‘Egypt’

The economic relations between the GDR and the Republic of Egypt are presented, starting with the trade agreement signed on May 7, 1953, and the exchange of consular representation. Political relations between the countries were hindered, according to the report, by pressure from the FRG on Egypt and the question of whether recognizing the GDR meant creating a deeper split between the FRG and the GDR. The report also mentions problems in meeting the export and import plans set forth in the trade agreement, including unpunctuality on the side of the GDR’s trade missions. The report states that Nasser enjoys great popularity in his country as a result of his position towards the West, social politics within the country, cooperation with other Arab countries and improvements in the industrial sector. This is followed by a detailed description of Egypt’s political situation and a proposition to extend political and economic cooperation while trying to reduce the influence of the West. Finally, the report recommends continued rejection of Israel's demands for compensation.

June 28, 1967

The Visit of the Czechoslovak President's Special Envoy, V. Koucki, to the UAR

The document summarizes Czechoslovak Politburo Secretary Vladimir Koucki's conversations with UAR President Gamal A. Nasser, Vice President Zakaria Muhi al-Din,and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Secretary Ali Sabri during his visit to the UAR. The conversations concerned the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the UAR's military and economic situation. Koucki draws three conclusions about the UAR's position, mentioning pressure from internal and external reactionary forces and the lagging national economy. The appendix contains a report on military issues raised during a conversation between the commander of the UAR armed forces, General Muhammad Fawzi, and General Miroslav Smoldash of the Czech delegation. Koucki attributes Egypt's defeat in the war to technical and tactical weaknesses of the military leadership. He recommends that Czech cooperation with the UAR include economic support, military training, and delivery of military equipment.

June 2007

The Cherepanov Case, 1968-1980 Folder 24. The Chekist Anthology

In this folder Vasili Mitrokhin reports that in 1968, a part-time student of the Vilnius Polytechnic University, Cherepanov, was sentenced to two years in a correctional facility for disseminating inflammatory leaflets in downtown Vilnius calling for the overthrow of the Soviet government. In 1970, he returned to Vilnius upon release and was unable to find employment. The KGB recruited Cherepanov, but in 1974 he was fired from the agency network for attempting to exploit his connection with the KGB for personal use, for behaving provocatively and making derogatory statements about the leadership of the KGB, and for intending to leave the Soviet Union.

In 1978, Cherepanov met Yolanda Vachatis, citizen of Canada. They tried to get married, but the KGB intervened. In January 1980, Cherepanov attempted to leave for Israel. He applied for permission from the Office of Visas and Registration at the Ministry of the Interior, but was denied.

In March 1980, Cherepanov met with Heikki A. Surye, citizen of Finland. Heikki agreed to assist Cherpanov and handed him a map marked with locations safe for escape. Cherepanov persuaded Surovets to come along. The two began collecting information critical of the Soviet regime in order to publish it in the Western press.

On June 30, Cherepanov and Surovets left Vilnius for Riga. Once in Riga, Cherepanov mailed a letter to Vachatis, who resided in France at that time, saying that he was planning to meet her there sometime in July. On July 7, Cherepanov and Surovets reached the border zone. The warning system was set off, but, due to a rainy weather, footsteps could not be traced, enabling Cherepanov and Surovets to cross the border. Heads of the 11th and 2nd customs checkpoints and others were reprimanded for negligence and mismanagement of the situation. Cherepanov and Surovets were taken back to the USSR on July 24.

May 20, 1969

Letter from Gamal Abdel Nasser sent to Haxhi Lleshi

This document is a letter from the United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser to Haxhi Lleshi, the Chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Council of the People's Republic of Albania. President Nasser appreciates the support of the People’s Republic of Albania for the UAR struggle against imperialism and Zionism. Nasser reveals that the policy of the UAR is based on the principle of non-alignment in order to decrease the chance of hostilities between the two blocs and to increase the prospect of peace. In addition, the UAR objects having foreign bases or foreign troops on its territory and asks for their liquidation elsewhere. In the case of a Soviet ship anchoring at a UAR port, this does not imply that the Soviet Union uses that port as its own base. Nasser also adds that the United States openly supports Israel and its 6th Fleet is a sign of an American guarantee to Israel in its ventures directed against the UAR. On the other hand, the presence of Soviet fleet units in the Mediterranean has hindered the transformation of the region into an American lake. As a consequence, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean establishes equilibrium there. This document contains both the original Arabic letter and the Albanian translation of the original.

June 2007

About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.

June 24, 1967

Record of Conversation between Polish Politburo member Zenon Kliszko and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow

Brevhnev describes discussions he's had with North Vietnamese leaders, who only want the U.S. bombings to end in order to open negotiations. He also discusses the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war at the UN General Assembly; even though the assembly condemned Israel, the Arabs are shaken by defeat. The only hope for the Arabs is the support of the USSR. He has also warned Fidel Castro not to push things too far.

July 11, 1967

Polish Record of Meeting of Soviet-bloc leaders (and Tito) in Budapest (excerpts)

Soviet-bloc leaders discuss fallout of the Six Day War on the Arab countries. The focus particularly on the critical need to support the "progressive" Nasser regime. There is some debate over whether more military aid to the Arabs is necessary or wasteful. The leaders make it clear that they support the existence of the State of Israel and want to avoid getting dragged into a wider Middle East War. The idea of UAR recognition of Israel in exchange for the right of return is floated. Kosygin also gives a summary of his meeting with Johnson in New York.

July 14, 1967

Telegram of the Romanian Legation in Tel Aviv to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Regarding Positions Taken by Foreign Diplomats and Israeli officials toward Romania, in light of the Position Adopted in the Middle East Conflict

The Romanian envoy in Tel Aviv writes of discussions with western European diplomats. They praise Romania’s independent stand in the Middle East crisis and its abstention from the Budapest Summit. He does let the western diplomats know that Romania still remains within the Warsaw Pact. He discusses Israeli policy of not withdrawing from the occupied territories until the State of Israel is recognized by the Arabs. Israel is also pushing France to lift the arms embargo.

May 30, 1967

Report on the talks of Josif Tito with UAR Ambassador Abuzeid in Vanga

Tito and Ambassador Abuzeid discuss events in Egypt and the Middle East.

Pagination