The two parties agree to worker, including Interior Ministry officials and university students, exchanges in the field of academia, law, politics, criminal investigation, fire-fighting, engineering, external relations, science and public safety. Provisions are made of the exchange of documents relating to criminology, public safety, the Soviet military, politics and fire-fighting techniques. Both parties agree to exchange information on thefts of shipments, detection and prevention of anti-state activity in border regions and the protection of public order.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

The parties agree to work together in protecting their soldiers from ideological diversion by anti-socialist agents and to continue exchanging information gathered by military counter-intelligence.

The two parties agree to exchange information on the general security situation in the border area of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union and on the operational situation along the common state border.

Both parties discuss the detection of and preparation for a surprise nuclear rocket attack by the USA on socialist countries, the intentions of the main hostile countries- the USA, other NATO countries, the People’s Republic of China- and cooperation to fight ideological diversion from hostile countries and emigrant populations. The two also agree to economic, tourism and cultural exchanges.

The parties agree to exchange information regarding the assurance of safety in civil aviation and the prevention of terrorist and other hostile acts. Plans are laid to coordinate steps for ensuring safety in airports in the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that are open for international flights and for flights between the two countries. All parties agree to exchange information on international, scientific and technical themes which interest the parties and raise the safety level of civil aviation transport.

The KGB and head representative of operative technical services for the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior agreed to a plan to continue the exchange of scientific-technical information and samples of operative technology and to convene meetings of specialists on these topics. The text of the coordination plan of summer 1972 - 1974 follows, and categories governed by it include technical documents, photographs, criminology, confidential documents, radio electronics and photo optics.

This cooperation agreement seeks to use Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation as a means to achieve the following objectives: (1) subverting attempts by hostile factions to infiltrate both countries' national and joint staff and military bodies having access to classified military information; (2) detection and obstruction of attempts by state enemies to carry out subversive acts against national and joint armed forces; (3) perfection of counter-intelligence security actions by the Warsaw Treaty united command; and (4) prevention and timely detection of possible leaks of classified information.