1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
East Asia
South Asia
North America
1893- 1976
1898- 1976
Southeast Asia
1917- 1984
1894- 1971
-
October 22, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the United Arab Republic [Egypt] describing a positive conversation between Chinese Ambassador Chen Jiakang and Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic Mahmoud Riad on China's testing of an Atomic Bomb.
October 20, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam entails positive responses of Le Duan, Pham Hùng and Ly Ban regarding China's first testing of an Atomic Bomb.
October 18, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia describing positive responses from Indonesian government officials and foreign government officials in Indonesia regarding China's nuclear test.
October 19, 1964
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Algeria describes positive responses of foreign government officials stationed in Algeria on China's first nuclear weapons test.
May 19, 1965
Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan describes different responses of Pakistani government officials and foreign government diplomats in Pakistan regarding China's first nuclear weapons test.
October 16, 1964
The Government of China announces its successful nuclear test but states that it will follow a no first use policy and in fact desires for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
March 27, 1967
Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.
January 11, 1967
Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”
April 23, 1965
Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.
October 1, 1962
This “Limited Distribution” report on possible Japanese reactions did not anticipate that a test would cause basic changes in US-Japan security relations or in Tokyo’s general approach to nuclear weapons.