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Documents

August 20, 1968

Report No. 10 from Generals Pavlovsky and Kovalov to Brigadier General Florian Siwicki

General Pavlovsky writes to the Commander of the Polish Second Army, Brigadier General Florian Siwicki. He lists preliminary steps in Operation Danube where the troops enter from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

August 20, 1968

On the Troops’ State of Readiness

Report given out by the Polish Army General Staff regarding the state of Polish combat troops for the intervention in Czechoslovakia. States that the armies are in full readiness and are ready to move toward Czechoslovakia at any time. An overview of the area in Czechoslovakia that they are invading is also given at length.

August 22, 1968

Report on the Polish Second Army, August 22, 1968 at 7:00 AM

Report states that Polish Second Army divisions are in good spirits and believe their mission to intervene in Czechoslovakia is a just cause. Report states that despite the good will of Polish soldiers, they face hostility from the Czech army and citizens alike. Report then states what actions should be undertaken.

August 24, 1968

Report on the Polish Second Army division taking part in Operation Danube

Report states there are no problems with the morale and political state of soldiers and officers of the Second Army, though the soldiers have faced open hostility from Czech citizens. Overall relations between Czech Army and Polish divisions are negative.

August 25, 1968

Report from Political Board of Polish Second Army

Report on the use of propaganda materials and how they have been distributed in Czech cities and villages. It also lists several incidents of hostility expressed by Czech soldiers/citizens towards Warsaw Pact soldiers.

August 26, 1968

Report from Polish Second Army’s Political Department at 7:35 hours

Report praises soldiers of the Polish Second Army for their political maturity and high spirits but says that relations between Czech citizens and soldiers of Second Army are not amicable. On August 25th, the political branch of Second Army led a propaganda operation designed for Czech society and soldiers.

August 26, 1968

Report from the Second Army's Political Department at 19:00 hours

Document continues reporting on relations between Czech citizens and Warsaw Pact armies as well as the state of Polish Second Army. Report describes propaganda dissemination in villages and cities as well as how unfriendly relations between Czech and Polish soldiers remain.

September 4, 1968

Report Regarding the Implementation of the Second Phase of Operation Danube

Chief of General Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defense General Chocha describes what steps need to be taken now that the Army is transitioning into the second phase of the "Danube" operation.

September 7, 1968

Report from the Political Department of Polish Second Army on the emotional-political condition of the soldiers taking part in Operation ‘Danube’

Report states the morale of soldiers taking part in Operation Danube is still good. But there is still no change in the unfriendly relations between Czech people and Warsaw Pact soldiers. The report describes how the Czech people are under the influence of revisionist and reactionary propaganda. It also details the conflict between Czech soldiers and Polish soldiers. It also gives an update of propaganda being broadcast through Czech radio stations.

June 6, 1979

Operational Directive from a Military Exercise Performed from June 6 to June 13, 1979

This document is a simulation of a Warsaw Pact response to a hypothetical NATO conventional attack on the GDR and the Baltic region. It provides pathways of assault with specific coordinates for naval maneuvers and specific objectives to be achieved on each day of hostilities. The United Baltic Fleet is supposed to make its way as quickly as possible to the North Sea. The ground counteroffensive first is to defend the GDR and then attack the FRG and advance along its northern coast to the border with the Netherlands and France. Other counteroffensive measures included: an amphibious landing on Bornholm and other Danish Islands, destroying aircraft carriers in the North Sea and disrupting the offshore oil platforms there. The document specifies exact villages and towns that are to be used as objectives for individual operations, and finally notes which types of units and existing divisions are supposed to participate in the counteroffensive.

Pagination