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Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

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Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

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Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

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Portrait of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung

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North Korea-China friendship celebrated at the DPRK mass games

China-North Korea Relations

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North Korea's First Five-Year Plan, 1957-1961

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Inter-Korean Relations after the War, 1954-1961

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Nam, Il

1915- 1976

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Soviet Union. Embassy (Korea : North)

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Pak, Song-chol (Pak Seong-cheol)

1913- 2008

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Japan's Itsukushima Shrine

East Asia

Japan

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Documents

August 26, 1976	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.219 The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang conveys the remarks of Han Sihae, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.
August 25, 1976	Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 084.527 The Embassy of Romania in Washington, D.C., assesses the United States response to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.
August 25, 1976	Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 066.252 The Embassy of Romania in Beijing assess the Chinese response to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.
August 21, 1976	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.212 The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang reports on the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.
August 20, 1976	Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.387 The Romanian Mission to the United Nations in New York reports on developments related to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident at the UN.
April 14, 1976	Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 083.895 The Embassy of Romania in Washington, D.C., conveys the remarks of Robert Martens, Head of Regional Affairs within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from the Department of State, on developments in Korea.
April 1, 1976	Telegram from Belgrade to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 017.807 The Embassy of Romania in Belgrade assesses the "tense" situation in Korea.
March 6, 1976	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.046 The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang summarizes remarks made by Ri Jong-mok, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister, on the military and security situation on the Korean Peninsula.
May 19, 1975	Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 050.572 The document summarizes North Korea's prospective approach towards unification. Pyongyang envisages three different paths: peaceful, military and revolutionary. In order to support these three routes to unification, the DPRK forwards three policies: the rapid development of socialism, promotion of democracy in South Korea and reinforcement of military solidarity with the revolutionary forces of the world.
March 11, 1975	Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.076 Popa observes an increase of US military presence in South Korea, including the transfer of nuclear weapons and notes that many see this move as Washington's way of coping with the Sino-Soviet split and increased division between Japan and the US.