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July 6, 1982	US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10276 to State Department, 'My Final Meeting with President Zia' After Ambassador General Vernon Walters’ second day meeting with President Zia, the Pakistani leader verbally acknowledged U.S. evidence that Pakistan sought nuclear weapons components from abroad despite promises not to do so. However, Zia refused to put this in writing, and in a letter to President Reagan claimed the U.S. intelligence was a “total fabrication,” likely in an effort to save face.
July 5, 1982	US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10239 to State Department, 'My First Meeting with President Zia' A report to the State Department from Ambassador General Vernon Walters on his meeting with President Zia, where he confronted the Pakistani President with “incontrovertible evidence” that his country had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan” despite promises not to do so. Zia denied the charge, and Walter later commented, “either he really does not know or is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”
June 17, 1982	Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government
November 21, 1981	Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or) Secretary of State Haig writes to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) to explain possible U.S. courses of action with regards to military and economic aid should Pakistan test a nuclear weapon. A test, Haig said, would “in all probability” lead to an end of economic and military support.
August 20, 1981	Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation' In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
June 11, 1981	Lewis A. Dunn, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 'Implications for US Policy of a Pakistani Nuclear Test' Memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggests that the prospects for dissuading a Pakistani nuclear test were dimming and suggests possible U.S. responses should detonate a device.
March 23, 1981	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan and the US: Seeking Ways to Improve Relations' A State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report on the desire of the Pakistani leadership to improve relations with the U.S. and negotiate a more substantial aid package. The report warns against becoming too close to General Zia, as close relations with him “might harm future relations” should he be swept from power.
January 31, 1980	Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith, enclosing excerpts from memoranda of conversations with Geng Biao and Deng Xiaoping. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an immediate impact on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet resistance through Islamabad. With these considerations, the U.S. chose to “set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being.”
September 8, 1979	Anthony Lake, director, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary of State Vance, 'The Pakistan strategy and Future Choices' Anthony Lake, director of the Policy Planning Staff, writes to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about available options to deter Pakistan’s further proliferation while still maintaining “good relations.” Lake suggests exploring the idea of pressuring groups and countries providing aid to Pakistan, and wonders whether the sale of F-16 fighter-jets could sway Pakistan’s military to scale back their nuclear effort.
June 6, 1979	US Department of State Cable 145139 to US Embassy India [Repeating Cable Sent to Embassy Pakistan], 'Non-Proliferation in South [Asia]' U.S. State Department cable states that the Carter administration has “reached a dead end” in its efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear technology in South Asia. The State Department is wary of taking too strong an approach to Pakistan’s nuclear endeavors, given the security ties between the two countries and concerns about Pakistan’s stability.